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Abstract
Computer networks are growing in complexity and size, making it challen-
ging to keep an inventory of computers and their software operating in a
network. Traditional solutions to this problem, like active scanning or soft-
ware agents on individual hosts cannot function in all environments and
can incur traffic overhead in the network or processing overhead on the
network hosts - and are therefore not the best solution in all environments.
This Master’s project has investigated the potential of using the power
of Intrusion Detection Systems, more specifically the IDS Bro, for asset de-
tection. The resulting system is passive, and therefore does not incur any
network traffic overhead, nor does it incur any processing overhead on the
monitored hosts. The thesis investigates techniques for gathering finger-
prints relevant to an IDS asset detection system, and describes a proof of
concept implementation to demonstrate the usefulness of this method.
iii
iv
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my ad-
visors, Professor Audun Jøsang, Tom Danielsen and Stian Jahr for their
feedback, corrections, suggestions and guidance on my thesis. Your help
was invaluable to my work.
I would also like to thank André Whitehouse for his help reading and com-
menting on this thesis.
I would like to thank my colleagues at mnemonic for providing a friendly,
supportive work environment and for generously sharing their knowledge,
which has helped me develop professionally these last 3 years.
And finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support
for the duration of this project.
For all you have done for me, you have my sincere thanks.
Philip Christian Scheel
University of Oslo
August, 2014
v
vi
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Goals and research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Background 5
2.1 What is asset detection? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Why asset detection? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 Asset consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2 Asset management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.3 Defense against threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Existing approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 Agent-based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3 Active scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.4 Passive TPC/IP fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.5 Software user-agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.6 Flow detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.7 The case for passive IDS-based asset detection . . . . 16
2.4 IDS-based asset detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Threats against asset detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.1 IP stack scrubbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.2 User agent/Server string modification . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5.3 Behavior modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Software lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 Design 25
3.1 Research method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Fingerprinting overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3 Procedure and tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.1 Gathering network traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
vii
3.3.2 Narrowing the traffic to the traffic of specific applica-
tions of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.3 Analyzing and extracting indicators . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Bro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4.1 Optimizing for speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 Implementation 39
4.1 Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1.1 Package managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1.2 Installation checkin traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.1 Greeting banners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.2 User agents and plugins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.3 Javascript libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.4 Website whitelist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.5 Server header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.6 X-Powered-By header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.7 Specific headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2.8 Filetypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.9 Port Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.10 Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.1 Update servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.2 Update URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4 Hostname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.1 HTTP Hostnames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.2 DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.3 DNS sniffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5 Proxy/NAT detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5.1 X-Forwarded-For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5.2 Proxy specific headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.5.3 Mutually exclusive OS/Software . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 Evaluation 59
5.1 Method of evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1.1 Evaluation environment and execution . . . . . . . . 59
5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2.1 Host detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2.2 OS detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.3 Software detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
viii
5.2.4 Hostname detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2.5 Port detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.3 Data presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6 Discussion 69
6.1 Quick PRADS comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.2 Comparison to proxy/HTTP logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.3 Learning another language to make use of the tool . . . . . . 71
6.4 Decaying Asset information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.4.1 Changes in assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.4.2 Changing IP address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.4.3 Timestamps, versions and decay . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.5 Opportunistic Security and general encryption . . . . . . . . 73
6.6 Privacy - in memory analysis vs. logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7 Conclusion and future work 77
7.1 Goal fullfillment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.2 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.1 Expanded ruleset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.2 Correlation rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.3 Tools for rule creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.4 Ruleset validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.2.5 IDS correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
A Explanation of acronyms and expressions 83
B Source Code 85
B.1 assetweb.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B.2 bridge.bro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
B.3 assets_fedora.bro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
ix
x
List of Figures
2.1 Venn diagram of minimum and maximum vulnerabilities . . 8
2.2 Spiceworks manual asset management example . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Spiceworks automatic asset management example . . . . . . 11
2.4 Example nmap scan for software versions . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 OSFuscate OS profile selector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6 User agent switcher for Firefox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 Malicious user injecting false traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8 Simple state diagram for the software lifecycle . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 Design Science Research Process Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Example tcpdump command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Port use identification with mandiant redline . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Use of tcpview to identify port usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Example use of the lsof command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6 Bro architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.7 Example HTTP request and response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.8 Example Bro script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.9 Example Bro script output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.10 Example use of brocut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1 APT-GET HTTP requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2 AMD installation checkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3 Some example banners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4 Reduced banner information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.5 Bro software.log, abbreviated for readability . . . . . . . . 44
4.6 Example server headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.7 Example X-Powered-By . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.8 Example of software-specific headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.9 Dropbox registration request (numbers replaced with #) . . . 51
4.10 Little Snitch update check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.11 VirtualBox update check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
xi
5.1 New hosts detected over 3 days, red arrows indicate mid-
night, blue arrows indicate mid-day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2 New Operating systems detected over 3 days, red arrow
indicate midnight, blue arrows indicate mid-day . . . . . . . 62
5.3 New software detected over 3 days, red arrow indicate
midnight, blue arrows indicate mid-day . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.4 New hostnames detected over 3 days, red arrows indicate
midnight, blue arrows indicate mid-day . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.5 New ports detected over 3 days, red arrows indicate mid-
night, blue arrows indicate mid-day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.6 Asset detection results presented in a web view . . . . . . . 66
6.1 Example of bro event documentation for dhcp release event 72
6.2 Simplified SSL proxy communication diagram . . . . . . . . 74
xii
List of Tables
5.1 Fingerprints used during evaluation of the proof of concept 60
xiii
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
With the rapid growth in both internet-connected devices and increased re-
liance on networked technology for businesses, it is becoming increasingly
important to adequately protect assets from adversaries in the form of hos-
tile agents and malicious software.
As networks grow in size and their connected hosts increase in com-
plexity, the task of keeping track of assets - such as physical machines and
their software - also increase in complexity. While smaller organizations
can keep track of assets manually, larger companies will eventually require
automation or improved processes to keep an accurate overview of their
assets.
Solutions such as host-based agents which report software installations
are typically impractical when those in need of this data are not in control
of the devices where these assets resides. Active scanning using tools such
as NMAP will only detect software listening on ports it can connect to. Ad-
ditionally, these scans will have to be continuously maintained in case of
changing configurations of the surveilled hosts.
Passive asset detection generally consists of one or more centrally
placed sensors placed in strategic places in networks where such detection
is desirable. Traffic is mirrored out from these points, and the asset de-
tection software will categorize the traffic and infer information about the
assets in the network. Because the traffic is captured in its entirety, an asset
detection system can evaluate relevant data from the lowest levels of the
1
Internet Protocol model (such as MAC addresses) up to software-specific
data in the application layer.
Bro is a network intrusion detection system with an event-based script-
ing language that allows reasoning over the data gathered. The software
can be installed on Linux, FreeBSD, and Mac OS X based hosts. Owing
to built-in parsers for many protocols, it is often simple to extract relevant
data and create scripts that trigger on malicious traffic or on other forms of
relevant information. In this Master’s project, Bro has been used as a plat-
form to implement asset detection methods.
1.2 Goals and research questions
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate a methodology for passive
asset detection on higher levels of the OSI model, and making a proof of
concept implementation based on this methodology.
The system should be relatively easy to extend for someone versed in
programming. Our fingerprinting-scripts should minimize the amount of
false positives, and not only detect ports used for services, but also the soft-
ware listening on the port. Client side software should also be detected.
The implemented system will consist of four parts:
• A Bro IDS installation
• A set of signature-scripts written for Bro to detect a limited set of
asset-related information
• A program that collects and inserts asset information into a database
• A system to present the data in an accessible manner
Based on these goals the research questions for this thesis has been
stated as follows:
• Q1) How can we design an asset detection system based on an IDS,
such as Bro?
• Q2) How practical is the process of collecting and using fingerprints
in an IDS context?
• Q3) What is the practical possible coverage of this type of system?
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1.3 Outline
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 2 explains the background
for asset detection, and provides most of the necessary background for this
thesis. Chapter 3 describes the design of the system used for the project,
along with tools and techniques used for gathering the data required for
writing signatures for detecting assets.
Chapter 4 describes the implementation of these techniques in making
specific signatures, demonstrating what information can be gathered at dif-
ferent stages of software’s lifecycle, and what data can be extracted from it.
Chapter 5 evaluates and discusses the results of implementing the
thesis. Chapter 6 discusses the results, and some of the potential problems
for a passive asset detection system. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, and
suggests future work and possible tools for asset detection systems.
3
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we discuss the background of asset detection, as well as the
motivations behind our target system. The chapter ends with a discussion
of some threats against asset detection and introduces the concept of a soft-
ware lifecycle.
2.1 What is asset detection?
To understand the concept of asset detection, we must first understand
what an asset is. The ISO-standard ISO 13335-1:2004 (section 3.2) defines
several types of assets, among them "physical assets (e.g., computer hard-
ware, communications facilities, buildings), information / data (e.g., docu-
ments, databases), software (...)". These are assets that can fall to IT depart-
ments to track, analyze and protect, which makes it a worthwhile goal to
have a way to detect and organize this information.
Asset detection is this requirement set into practice. Asset detection is
a process of – usually - continuous tracking of assets in an organizations
inventory.
In an ideal situation, an asset management system will have access to
a wide variety of data relevant to the needs of an administrator or other
users of the system. Data such as that mentioned in the ISO definition, but
also potentially things like the hostname of each machine, users operating
it and other metadata that may be useful.
This thesis concentrates on the assets mentioned in the excerpt of the
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ISO definition, as these are the asset types that are generally available for
analysis for a network-based listening service. Passive network based as-
set detection only has access to data transferred over the wire, and there-
fore has some limitations when compared to other more active or invasive
forms of asset management.
2.2 Why asset detection?
There are numerous motivations for doing asset detection in an organiza-
tion. This section explains some of these.
2.2.1 Asset consolidation
Once an organization has gained an overview over its assets, it can accom-
plish various tasks with it.
One of these tasks is the unification of versions of software and hard-
ware. By keeping assets uniform across the organization, much of the
work that goes into repeated tasks are simplified because these tasks are
done over a smaller set of variables. This simplifies tasks such updates,
upgrades, software and hardware deployment, planning, troubleshooting
and other use cases.
Asset detection can be used both for the initial mapping of software and
hardware in an organization, as well as in later planned upgrade cycles.
Many companies have a PC life cycle where machines are upgraded every
few years. In these situations, an asset management system will ideally
hold all the necessary information to find the machines that should be up-
graded. This situation carries over to software, such as planned upgrades
for operating systems or software applications.
2.2.2 Asset management
Closely tied to the arguments for consolidating software and hardware is
the potential usage of statistics taken from an asset management system.
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Statistics on an organization’s install base allows for evidence-based
choices when planning and designing future solutions.
An example of where such usage is useful is when deciding specifica-
tions for new software. In the case of the development of a custom web
application, it makes sense to consult a list of web browsers currently in
use in the organization, and setting down compatibility requirements ac-
cording to this information.
Another potential usage is the possibility of detecting installations
of software with special licensing requirements. This can allow for
verification of license compliance in cases where the license allows for only
specific numbers of software installations.
2.2.3 Defense against threats
A very interesting use case for asset information is the case of defense
against various security threats. There are several ways one can leverage
good information about assets in the organization to reduce the exposure
to threats.
An attack surface as a concept in software can be summarized as the
total sum of attack vectors available in an application. In the OWASP wiki
[3], an attack surface is described as all of the different points where an at-
tacker could get into a system, and where they could get data out.
A system with more than one version of the same software has at a
minimum the same amount of shared attack vectors in each version, and in
most cases will have additional ones based on either older vectors which
have been fixed (bugs) or newer vectors added in the newer versions.
When an organization has more than one version of software available
in a network, it offers an attacker more potential points to penetrate secur-
ity or pivot their attack from. A visualization of the attack surface of two
separate software versions can be seen in figure 2.1.
By having an overview of software in use in an organization, it is pos-
sible to reduce the attack surface, both by consolidating software versions –
ideally to the newest version – and different software that serves the same
purpose in an organization. In environments where the IT department is
7
Figure 2.1: Venn diagram of minimum and maximum vulnerabilities
not able to push updates to the clients automatically, the use of software
version lists allows them to contact end users to make them install required
updates, or to uninstall software not allowed under the organization policy.
Another important method in the effort of securing the organization
against network related threats is the binding between software versions
and attack signatures through the use of Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures initiative’s identifiers (CVEs)[9]. In many IDS systems, such as
Snort, Suricata and ISS Proventia, many of the signatures will have one or
more associated CVEs. By listing software which is in use and accessible
in the organization through the network, it is possible to map out a threat
profile over what vulnerabilities the network is exposed to. This can be
helpful in two very meaningful ways.
When profiling the IDS sensor and policy, such a list allows an analyst
to remove the signatures that cover vulnerabilities the organization is not
likely to have.
Secondly, when reviewing the total set of signatures available to the
sensor, finding it to not cover all vulnerabilities, new and relevant signa-
tures can be written, or an assessment of the security risk of continued use
of software with an uncovered vulnerability can be done.
Another use of asset detection system for defensive purposes is the po-
tential of using fingerprints of files to detect what files are being served
from servers under the system’s protection – and when these files are mod-
ified. In the case of files being served over HTTP, there is always a risk of a
compromised server distributing modified – and in many cases malicious
– files to users. By tagging these files as assets and detecting their trans-
fers and modification, we can potentially detect compromised servers and
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potentially stop a loss of reputation as a consequence of compromising a
customer.
A final reason why good knowledge about assets is important is the
support it offers in the investigation by analysts during security incidents.
When an IDS alarm has been triggered, one of the first steps to an analyst
is to decide if the event is a false positive or not. If the attack is specific to
a vulnerability, and the victim machine is not running software which has
that vulnerability, it is likely that the attack has not been successful. By hav-
ing information that allows an analyst to make this conclusion early, and
thus discount the event, the analyst is freed to spend more time on events
that are likely to be impactful.
2.3 Existing approaches
There are several approaches to asset detection and registration. In this
subsection of the thesis, some categories of these approaches will be enu-
merated and briefly explained, with an accompanying assessment of ad-
vantages as well as drawbacks to each method.
2.3.1 Manual
One method of keeping an overview of assets is the classical method of
manual asset inventory. Organizations may decide to use a manual method
of keeping inventory of hardware and software. Usually, such a method
will involve a registration of hardware as it is delivered to the end user,
changes to registration as changes are done by staff, and possibly execut-
ing a scheduled inventory at intervals to ensure that the inventory remains
accurate.
The method works for many smaller organizations, where it is easier
and cheaper to keep such an inventory rather than invest the time and re-
sources in other methods.
Manual asset inventory has a low initial overhead compared to setting
up dedicated server or software packages, and can usually be done in sys-
tems such as Microsoft Excel. More advanced examples of manual registra-
tions can be found in the manual component of the popular helpdesk and
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network inventory software Spiceworks, as seen in figure 2.2
Figure 2.2: Spiceworks manual asset management example
There is also a lower overhead in skill requirements when compared to
the other methods. Someone registering such information will likely not
have to have much specialized skill to detecting and registering hardware
and software on computers.
Given that the analysis of the hardware and software is manual, it is
also possible to access a lot more data when compared to other methods
mentioned in this thesis. It does not face the same constraints as passive
network based asset detection or scanning solutions, which can only do
analysis on traffic that travels over the network.
This method also offloads a lot of the computational overhead present
in other methods to human-intensive workloads instead, which may be
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wanted in situations where there is no equipment or budget for the work,
but manpower is available.
On the negative side, this method is the least scalable method of those
discussed in this thesis. While it usually has a low initial overhead, the
ongoing overhead is much higher per asset inventoried. In many organiza-
tions, especially those bigger than a small office, the overhead cost per asset
will quickly make it more economical to decide on a more scalable system
of inventory.
2.3.2 Agent-based
A computer-powered analogue to the manual method mentioned above is
to replace the manual process of having a human registering assets and
keeping them updated with a software agent that does the same thing.
There are two types of these agents. One is a software agent that will run
on each machine being inventoried, registering software, configuration and
hardware information. Alternatively, software will run on a central ma-
chine, which will log in and query the machine for assets using built in
utilities. Spiceworks is one program which has the capability of logging
into and inventorying machines on your network, as seen in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Spiceworks automatic asset management example
The method is very scalable, and can be done at a relatively quick pace
depending on the implementation. This allows for continuous updates as
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changes happen.
Information-wise, you are only limited to what the agent is capable of
gathering, so depending on budget for development it is potentially pos-
sible to aquire all information available to the machine it is running on.
Some limitations to this approach must be mentioned.
It is a more intrusive method, when compared to passive and active
network-based detection, since it requires either the installation of an agent
on each machine being assessed, or access to these machines from a central
machine doing remote calls to retrieve the same information. This leads to
the following problems:
If the system is using an agent, the agent will have to be programmed so
that it can run on all operating systems that should be assessed. Addition-
ally, there might be differences in how each version of an OS will expose
information that is relevant to the asset detection agent. As an example,
Debian and RedHat Linux have different package managers used for in-
stalling software, and an agent will have to be aware of these differences
should it be designed to access software installation and version informa-
tion using their respective package managers.
Depending on the circumstance surrounding the use of the asset detec-
tion system, there are some problems with the intrusiveness of this solu-
tion. In many environments, it is not acceptable to all stakeholders to
provide those in charge of the asset detection system access to all machines.
This is especially true in cases where an external party is hired as a Man-
aged Security Service Provider. In these cases, the external party may not
be given complete access to the machines being protected. The same limit-
ation exists in mixed networks, such as student networks at schools, where
security has to be provided, but direct access is not available.
2.3.3 Active scanning
The first completely network-based asset detection method that will be
covered in this thesis is the use of active scanning using tools such as
NMAP. These tools use active network connections in order to gather in-
teresting information about the machines on the network.
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NMAP, as one of the archetypical examples of this type of scanners,
has many features interesting to asset detection, including detecting hosts
present in the network through several different forms of pinging, open
port detection, operating system detection by fingerprinting the TCP/IP
stack and software version probing for some protocols[12].
NMAP has reached its status as an invaluable tool to network admin-
istrators, security auditor and others due to its ease of use. Additionally,
it allows for relatively quick scans of wide IP ranges, due to NMAP being
designed for performance - using algorithms and parallel processing[14].
Such scans are usually not only for existing hosts, but also for listening
ports – depending on launch options, of course.
One major advantage that active scanning tools have over passive
network-based solutions is the possibility of detecting less active network-
connected assets. That is, unlike passive asset detection systems it can de-
tect hosts where there is no incoming or outgoing traffic that will reveal it.
Active scanning generally has a low overhead human-workload wise,
since it usually only has to be installed on hosts installed at points in the
network where the scans should be taken from. After installation, the scans
can be initiated and left alone while they execute.
In the same vein, another advantage is that execution of such scans is
usually relatively quick.
There are, however, some weaknesses to the active scanning approach.
The limitations that are important to us both stem from the same problem:
active scanning induces stimulus to get a response – which is then ana-
lyzed.
This means that a scan for open ports and services is limited to ports
that respond to stimulus during the scan. A system like this will not detect
transient services, client-mode software, nor services that are only available
after other stimulus (like port knocking).
This also means that an active scanner is limited to addressable space
for the network node from which it runs. It is unable to detect software or
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other assets which are made unavailable behind a proxy or a NAT router.
This kind of network setup is common where policy may dictate a divi-
sion of networks into different zones. This problem could potentially be
bypassed by distributing more scanning nodes into each of the networks
where scans are required.
A final disadvantage to active scanning with tools such as NMAP is that
they are relatively noisy when used in environments with IDS, generating
alerts in many IDS tools.
2.3.4 Passive TPC/IP fingerprinting
A passive approach to asset detection is the use of passive TCP/IP finger-
printing. This concept bases itself on the same features as those used in sev-
eral active scanning tools such as NMAP, and is based on detecting default
settings in the IP stack corresponding to fingerprints for different operat-
ing systems. It separates itself from active scanning tools by not generating
stimulus, only working passively by reading traffic generated during nor-
mal operation. Different operating systems will often have a measurable
difference in settings – which will generate responses with specific features.
These setting differences are usually recognizable in the TCP headers, but
also on the IP headers.
p0f, a tool which pioneered many of these techniques, uses the initial
client-originating SYN packet, as well as the server-originating SYN+ACK
packet, to attempt to fingerprint the operating system of both network
nodes. Features, such as TCP and IP header default settings, ordering of
TCP options and other quirks are used to detect the operating systems.
This method of asset detection is scalable, since it works passively. Ad-
ditionally, it does not need to do deep packet inspection, since it in the case
of p0f only needs to look at the initial packets of the TCP handshake for
information. This lowers the memory overhead in the machine doing the
analysis of the network traffic.
The negative to this technique is that it is restricted to detecting the
OS TCP/IP stack only, which offers a very limited amount of information
when compared to other techniques presented in this chapter.
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2.3.5 Software user-agents
Another approach, which can be used both actively and passively is using
the software server or user-agent strings for software detection. Server and
User agent strings are strings sent as part of the protocol to identify the ver-
sion of the client or server that is communicating.
This type of fingerprinting is present in both NMAP and p0f, achieving
the goal of detecting specific software and their version. In the p0f case, the
information is used to indicate which OS is present on the node, by map-
ping software by its OS availability. An example NMAP scan for software
versions present on a host can be seen in listing 2.4
Nmap scan repor t f o r 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1
Host i s up ( 0 . 0 0 3 0 s l a t e n c y ) .
Not shown : 996 f i l t e r e d ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/ tcp open domain dnsmasq 2 . 6 8
80/ tcp open http l i g h t t p d 1 . 4 . 3 5
443/ tcp open s s l /http l i g h t t p d 1 . 4 . 3 5
5666/ tcp open tcpwrapped
Figure 2.4: Example nmap scan for software versions
The advantage of this approach to detecting assets is that it is relatively
accurate, relying on payload data to identify assets. It can also be done
passively, which lowers the network overhead for using it to detect assets.
The disadvantage is the resource usage as compared to TCP/IP finger-
printing. Since this kind of traffic analysis works on data from the payload
of network traffic, the system will have an overhead for analysis. A passive
system will have to do reassembly of packets until it finds the strings it is
looking for, and an active scanner will need to establish the connection and
exchange data to get the strings.
2.3.6 Flow detection
A final approach to passive asset detection was presented in UiO Mas-
ter’s student Mats Klepsland’s thesis “Passive Asset Detection using Net-
Flow”[10]. The technique relies on using NetFlow flows to detect network
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assets, communicating ports, and OS update servers.
NetFlow is a format for describing communication flows inside a net-
work, summarizing statistics for entire sessions in single entries. These
statistics can be used to map communicating hosts and ports in a network.
The data can be generated directly on Cisco routers or from pcap data.
An advantage of this approach is that it is very scalable, given that data
is given in summarized form from the sensors themselves. Additionally,
the summarized data does not take up much space, and therefore historical
data can be saved for later analysis, even against new fingerprints.
The main problem with this technique is that we only have some very
basic information about the network traffic, which makes it hard to accur-
ately detect deeper information about the hosts. Detecting service types
running on a host by their port number is possible, but it is impossible to
accurately know what specific service is running on the port.
2.3.7 The case for passive IDS-based asset detection
A final type of approach, building on some of the above described passive
techniques, is passive IDS-based asset detection which is presented in this
thesis. There are some points in favor of designing an asset detection sys-
tem around the concept of intrusion detection systems.
Less intrusive
First and foremost the use of an IDS for the purpose of categorizing assets
is in many ways less intrusive than many of the solutions above.
A passive network solution to asset detection requires one or more
sensors placed centrally in the network, able to listen to passing traffic.
Since the solution is passive, it does not generate any network traffic,
and it leaves no risk of harmful side effects of probing activity. Since all
processing is done on the sensors/outside of the network, the use of such a
system minimizes the resource overhead on machines and on the network
of the audited organization.
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Unlike the agent-based solutions above, it does not require direct ac-
cess and installation/execution privileges on the assets being audited. This
makes the solution ideal for Managed Security Service Providers, as they
will typically require this information for informed decision-making on
security-events, but often do not have access to central asset information,
nor direct access to network clients.
Scalable
The solution is also very scalable. Initial overhead in terms of manpower
is small, since the setup requires only the installation of a single or a few
sensors depending on network throughput and design. When compared
to installing agents or manually indexing all machines in the network, this
is a very big reduction in work.
For the same reason, the deployment of new signatures is reduced to
just modifying the sensors, rather than all machines in the network.
A final consideration is that this analysis can also be done asynchron-
ously, in that we can collect data over time, and later analyze it. This pos-
sibility allows for more analysis to be done at off-peak hours, at the cost of
data storage for pcap files.
2.4 IDS-based asset detection
What separates the system described in this thesis from the previously
mentioned passive solutions is the choice to leverage the strength of an IDS
to gather and analyze data for the asset detection system. This brings some
additional capabilities to the table, and removes some of the inadequacies
in the abovementioned systems.
The most obvious result of moving to a system where we can do ana-
lysis over payload data is that we have more data to analyze, which allows
us to form more accurate signatures. It also allows us to make signatures for
cases where under other solutions it is impossible to distinguish between
different types of assets. In the case of NetFlow analysis, a source of false
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positives for OS detection was theorized to be update server reuse for Mi-
crosoft products, where Microsoft Office updates looked like Windows up-
dates to the system.
As a result of the increase in available data to analyze, there is also a
sharp increase in the amount of “low hanging fruit” in terms of informa-
tion available for analysis. Many of the signatures introduced in the Im-
plementation chapter are based upon relatively simple analysis of URLs
requested by software.
2.5 Threats against asset detection
Throughout this thesis, it is important to keep in mind that it is very pos-
sible, and in many cases simple, to subvert the techniques used to detect
and identify assets. As far as is possible, the thesis describes how such sub-
version can be done in the specific cases in the Implementation chapter, but
this section describes in broad stokes the three primary methods that are
relevant to us.
2.5.1 IP stack scrubbing
IP stack scrubbing is the concept of modifying the default settings of the
TCP/IP stack or by modifying the packets after they have left the stack .
The end result is the same: to a passive or active listener using TCP/IP
fingerprinting, the packets can be made to look originate from an entirely
different OS than from what it actually is.
The software to modify the characteristic TCP and IP header output is
available for many platforms. OSfuscate is a tool for Windows, which mod-
ifies default settings used by the network stack in windows. This is done
by modification of HKEY values in the registry of Windows. The tool con-
tains profiles of default settings for several system types, as can be seen in
figure 2.5.
IPPersonality takes a more limited version of this concept to defend
linux hosts against NMAP type OS detection. It tries to detect abnormal
traffic of the type NMAP generates, and responds in place of the system
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Figure 2.5: OSFuscate OS profile selector
with packets corresponding to a user-chosen OS profile.
2.5.2 User agent/Server string modification
Another modification which is more commonly use on the Internet is the
modification of the headers for User agent strings and Server strings in
HTTP communications.
User agent strings have been used for compatibility purposes in web
development for a long time, and have lately been used for separating
between mobile and desktop users.
The modification of this string is usually not detrimental to the end user,
and in some cases this kind of modification may be necessary to let the end
user gain access to services which are limited to only certain user agent
strings. This is the case for the popular video streaming service Netflix,
which does not allow most Linux users access to its services. In conjunction
with the plugin system pipelight, user agent switching allows end users
access to artificially constrained platforms like Netflix[2]. For this reason,
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Figure 2.6: User agent switcher for Firefox
many of the major browsers have plugins that allows for rapid changing
between different User agent strings, as can be seen for Firefox in figure 2.6.
The Server string has been even less useful for the most part, and many
encourage administrators to modify settings to ensure software version
data is not leaking to an attacker. In the case of the popular Apache web
server, the capability of entirely modifying the server string is provided by
the mod_security module project.
2.5.3 Behavior modification
A more active type of fingerprinting countermeasure is the active use of
behavior that the end user knows will mislead the asset detection system.
This could include connecting to update servers for software that is not
installed, opening listening ports and in general emulating the behavior
that asset detection systems are trying to detect.
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This thesis does not discuss methods to avoid fingerprinting in detail.
The reason for this is twofold.
A sufficiently determined adversary can generate as much traffic as she
likes to confuse us (as in figure 2.7), and there is very little we can do about
such behavior without direct control over the network connected machine
used to generate the misleading data.
Figure 2.7: Malicious user injecting false traffic
Secondly, the proposed use of this system is an asset detection system
for an organization or a service provider, where it is assumed that the as-
sets being protected are not controlled by our adversaries, but rather by
end users which wish for optimal protection.
Since we in most cases cannot eliminate threats against fingerprinting,
an option to reduce the risks of manipulated data is to be aware that they
exist, and to intelligently assess the data the system has gathered. One
must be very aware of inconsistent data, and seek information gathered in
an alternate manner if the data is suspect.
In the implementation of this thesis, this was partially achieved by not
aggregating together less trustworthy sources of data, and thus allowing
the analyst to make a decision on the how sufficient the data is. This was
done on all entries gathered by hostname signatures, as these vary in how
trustworthy they are due to the source of the data (HTTP hostnames and
21
DNS replies). While a web server can modify what hostnames it responds
to, and a malicious user can inject requests for hostnames it wants to imply
are hosted on the web server, the malicious user will have to gain control
over the DNS server or DHCP server to inject data confirming the mali-
ciously injected data for these alternative sources of hostnames.
2.6 Software lifecycle
A final concept that needs introduction before use later in the thesis is the
Software lifecycle. This lifecycle describes the general common stages in
the “life” of software while in the hands of the owner and end-user, and
can be seen in figure 2.8. The concept is mentioned here because the Imple-
mentation chapter is divided into these stages, since each stage usually is
shared across many different types of software.
Figure 2.8: Simple state diagram for the software lifecycle
Most software will go through all of these stages during its lifetime on
a machine. Each stage can contain multiple indicators that can be detected
on the network.
The Installation stage can typically contain requests for installation files,
requests for configurations or updated default data. Optionally, and less to
the support of the software installation, is the use of registration or checkin
traffic for statistics purposes for the developer.
22
The Use stage is the stage which is most varied of the stages. The fin-
gerprints present in this stage is entirely dependent on the purpose of the
software in question. Typical indicators are ports being opened, specific
telltales in the protocols being used by the software or traffic towards spe-
cific IP addresses or hostnames.
The update stage generally consists of either checks for updates, or the
download of said updates when they are available. Today, most updates
are handled over HTTP, which makes much of the analysis very simple.
The final stage is the uninstallation stage. In an asset detection system,
this stage can only be used to unregister or delete asset information.
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Chapter 3
Design
The goal of this thesis is to develop a method for passive asset detection
on higher levels of the OSI model based on the use of intrusion detection
systems.
This chapter is dedicated to explaining the research methodology used
for the research in this thesis. This is followed by a section discussing some
of the relevant types of information an asset detection system may be ex-
pected to gather, the progress of gathering and reducing the data necessary
for making fingerprints, and some of the tools I found useful to develop
said signature-scripts for detecting assets. The tools are divided into the
following 3 categories:
• Gathering network traffic
• Narrowing the traffic to the traffic of specific applications of interest
• Analyzing and extracting indicators
3.1 Research method
My research project has been structured to follow the research methods of
a Design Research Process, as presented by Vaishnavi and Kuechler[16].
This method is divided into multiple stages of development. At the
awareness of problem stage, the research problems were identified. Following
this, in the suggestion stage, tentative designs for solutions to the research
problems were developed. In the development stage, a potential solution to
the research questions was developed and implemented. The next stage,
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evaluation, was the stage in which the solution was evaluated for perform-
ance. In both of these stages, when encountering situations that did not
work according to the proposed solution, the project followed the circum-
scription arrow seen in 3.1, taking into account the knowledge of what did
and did not work on to the next iteration of developing the solution. The
last stage seen in the diagram, the conclusion, was the stage in which the
final accepted results were reached.
This research method follows many of the same patterns as iterative
forms of software development. Since this type of development is
something I have experience with, and since a large part of the project
was to develop an asset detection system, using a research method which
complements this seemed to be a prudent choice. Additionally, the iterative
nature of finding and refining and redeveloping fingerprints for assets
allowed me to carry over the methods to the smaller parts of the research
project.
Figure 3.1: Design Science Research Process Model
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3.2 Fingerprinting overview
One of the primary things to remember when making asset detection fin-
gerprints is the Unique pattern mentality[15]. This means that we have to
isolate behavior or indicators which are specific to certain software or other
assets.
To begin with, it is important to understand what data is relevant for
an asset detection system. Previously in this thesis, arguments were made
for motivations behind using asset detection. The data we wish to find per
network host reflect these motivations.
The data which is usually accessible and interesting to a software asset
detection system are the following:
• Operating system, version and platform arch
• Software – and its version
• Ports with a listening service
The Operating System of the machine is relevant for several reasons.
First and foremost, it is the primary software of a machine, and governs
most of the internal functions of the machine it runs on. Operating systems,
as the provider of software’s environment, is also often a limiting factor in
what software will be available on the machine in question. When a ma-
chine with a Linux based operating system is the only system on a host, it
is possible to disregard entire classes of attacks – such as IIS specific vul-
nerabilities. Since IIS is a proprietary web server only made for Windows
operating systems, any such attack is likely to be irrelevant to the host in
question.
The instruction set architecture of a processor defines the low level
codes and registers available to the software running on it. This means
that software and operating systems will have to be compiled specifically
to the architecture of the processor. This is usually called the arch of an OS.
The arch of a system is not quite as interesting by itself, as most software is
not arch-specific unless it uses a lot of low-level code. It is, however, inter-
esting for distinguishing different operating systems installations behind
a network address. If there are mutually exclusive indicators, such as dif-
ferent OS arches registered to the same IP address, the information can be
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used to pinpoint IP addresses that are assigned to a NAT or proxying host.
Knowing what specific software - and its versions – runs on a machine is
primarily interesting because of the vulnerabilities they represent. For each
software installation and each of their versions, there will in most cases be
vulnerabilities that apply specifically to them.
Detecting open ports on a host is interesting because it will give an in-
dication of the class of software that resides on a network node, if not the
software itself. An open TCP port 80 on a host will generally be a good
indication that a webserver runs on the host. Some software also use spe-
cific ports by default, and when these ports are not used by other software,
they can be used to infer that said software will be running on the host. An
example of this is the game Doom, which will generally listen on port 666
(tcp and udp).
Additionally, as mentioned in the motivations section, the OS and soft-
ware versions are also relevant for standardization of the software stack,
and for keeping an overview over available assets.
In the information security field, there is one other activity that closely
mirrors what we experience when gathering signatures for detecting soft-
ware as assets. Gathering IOCs, or Indicators of Compromise, is a well-
known task that is usually associated with making signatures for detecting
malware. With the exception that malware is considered to be malicious –
and therefore must be analyzed in a safe environment - there is little differ-
ence in the techniques which can be used to gather fingerprints which are
unique to the software.
IOCs as a field is more far-reaching compared to the information that
someone writing signatures for a passive asset detection system will need.
Since gathering IOCs also extends to artifacts on the machine running
the malware, tools and techniques will also be looking for indicators like
memory artifacts, md5 sums of files, computer libraries loaded, as well as
other indicators. Given that the only place where a passive network-based
system has access to data is on the network layer, we generally only care
about IOCs which are possible to track in the network.
When analyzing software, it is important to understand that while some
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software sends network traffic of its own initiative, other behavior needs to
be induced. This can be characterized as stimulus/response – and is im-
portant when writing signatures to detect behavior that we are interested
in. Some software allows the user to induce a check for updates online. The
stimulus in this case, is the user clicking “Check for updates online”. The
response – from the network perspective – is a request for the software’s
update server. Inducing stimulus to get the desired response allows for a
faster workflow when collecting indicators for software installations, and
can be completely necessary to gather fingerprints that are not generated
by automatically scheduled behavior.
3.3 Procedure and tools
This section describes the general procedures used to gather the data ne-
cessary to make asset fingerprints. Each subsection contains some choices
in tools that may be helpful in the process.
3.3.1 Gathering network traffic
When gathering network traffic, we have a rich set of options in tools to
use. During my work, I limited myself to two of them – tcpdump and
Wireshark. Many of the tools available for analysis of network traffic are
based around the libpcap/winpcap libraries. Most of the tools I used for
further analysis while working on this thesis are based around these librar-
ies.
Tcpdump is a tool for capturing and analyzing packets. It is available
on most unix-like operating systems, and is therefore a good tool when
investigating the network traffic of software running on hosts with these
operating systems. Additionally, I used tcpdump (as seen in listing 3.2) to
capture data on a dedicated sensor based on Linux, with port-mirroring
from a central switch in my own test environment.
sudo tcpdump − i eth0 −w filename . pcap
Figure 3.2: Example tcpdump command
Using tcpdump to record all traffic allows for some important parts of
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the workflow which is useful, or even necessary, for writing good asset de-
tection scripts.
One of the primary reasons for capturing full packet dumps of the rel-
evant traffic is that after capture you can run the recorded file through sev-
eral different tools, as well as testing your finished asset detection scripts.
Keeping the full dump allows for reproducibility of the work, and insures
you can check improved scripts for unintended loss of functionality.
On windows hosts, one can use the tcpdump alternative windump. Al-
ternatively, if working in a graphical environment, tools such as Wireshark
allows for packet captures, as well as further analysis of the captured pack-
ets.
3.3.2 Narrowing the traffic to the traffic of specific applications of
interest
Once we have recorded a network capture containing the indicators we are
after, we have to separate out said indicators from other behavior.
There are two good ways of separating out the indicators relevant to
the program we are investigating; either by IP or by port.
Separating out indicators by IP is useful in the case where a dedicated
sensor is capturing the data (along with other network traffic). The host(s)
behind the IP in question should ideally reduce the amount of nonrelated
network communication while the software generates its traffic. A possible
way of implementing this is to use a dedicated virtual machine to have a
clean and reproducible environment for the investigated software to run
on.
Virtual machines are also useful in that you can make a custom network
with several virtual machines to observe behavior in isolation.
Separating indicators by ports is useful when investigating software
running on a workstation where other software may also be communic-
ating, but where we have access to execute commands. By detecting which
ports are used by the software, we can separate out traffic that is related
to the software in question. This allows for a reduction in overhead time
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cost when compared to setting up a dedicated environment to investigate
single pieces of software.
One tool, which can be helpful in cases where one wishes to collect fin-
gerprints, is Mandiant Redline. This software suite was made for gather-
ing and analyzing malware Indicators of Compromise. It consists of a pro-
gram that allows generating agents that can be run on computers suspected
of containing malware, which in turn gather various types of information
which can be used to make IOCs.
For our purposes, the tool is used in a 3 part process. Generating a Col-
lector, running it on a machine with the software we wish to gather data
on, and analyzing the data in Redline.
Generating the Collector is a relatively simple task. The important part
of this is to make sure that the collector will be gathering port usage and
DNS lookups.
Following this, the collector is run on the machine where the analyzed
software resides. Here it gathers various indicators as they occur, and re-
cord them to disk.
Finally, the report can be generated by Redline using said data to
present the indicators gathered, as seen in figure 3.3.
Alternatives to this process is the use of TCPView for windows, which
enumerates all TCP and UDP endpoints on a windows-based computer,
along with the process which owns the port. The utility is available from
microsoft’s webpages. The use of this tool to find ports in use can be seen
in figure 3.4
On the GNU/Linux, *BSD and OS X side, one can use the command line
utility lsof with the –i option. lsof is an utility to display all open files
and the programs which open them. The –i option limits the output to
Internet files (open ports and connections). The utility is present on many
unix-like systems. An example run can be seen in figure 3.5
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Figure 3.3: Port use identification with mandiant redline
Figure 3.4: Use of tcpview to identify port usage
3.3.3 Analyzing and extracting indicators
Finally, when we have an initial starting point to go over the network
packet dump, we can investigate the content of the dump for indicators.
The primary tool for me was the use of Wireshark, which allows for
sorting packets by expressions, and interpretation of some protocols. An-
other very useful tool when investigating is the built in facilities of Bro. By
activating the subset of scripts relevant to your analysis – like the HTTP
logs, and then investigating for indicators relevant to the software being
analyzed one can make a script using the built in scripting facilities, and
iteratively work towards making a script which outputs the desired asset
indicators.
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Figure 3.5: Example use of the lsof command
3.4 Bro
Bro is a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) with a clear separa-
tion of the engine and policy[13].
Architecturally, the Bro IDS is divided into 3 parts: the libpcap based
network sniffer for passive traffic gathering, the main engine, and the
policy scripts. This can be seen in figure 3.6
Figure 3.6: Bro architecture
Traffic is passively gathered from an interface on the sensor, usually off
a mirrored port from a central part of the network to be protected by the
sensor. Packets are passed directly to the event engine.
The event engine assembles the various packets into bi-directional
streams of data. These streams of data are then analyzed by the various
protocol analyzers in the event engine. These analyzers then trigger events
based on the traffic it detects. These events are then passed onto the policy
33
scripts that reside in “scriptland”.
Event handlers in the policy scripts are then invoked with the data from
the event engines. These scripts containing event handlers constitute the
policy of the network sensor. There are a number of scripts included with
the Bro distributions, but administrators are expected to add more scripts
to fit their own needs as well.
This separation of analysis of protocol and analysis of content allows
for a more effective working process when making IDS signatures – or in
our case, fingerprints of assets.
As an example, a client 10.0.0.2 makes an HTTP request to a
webserver 10.0.0.3, requesting the root document for a hostname ex-
ample.com. On the wire, the traffic might look something like that seen
in figure 3.7
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host : example . com
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date : Mon, 16 Jun 2014 1 7 : 1 6 : 5 4 GMT
Server : Werkzeug / 0 . 8 . 1 Python / 2 . 7 . 3
Content−Type : t e x t /html ; c h a r s e t =utf−8
Content−Length : 13864
Vary : Accept−Encoding
<!DOCTYPE html>
[ t r a f f i c t runcated ]
Figure 3.7: Example HTTP request and response
To map the relationship between the Host field of an HTTP request and
the responding server banner (Werkzeug), a manual process will have to di-
vide the traffic into request and responses, a parser would have to find
the Host field in the request, and then another parser will have to find
the Server field in the response. In a bro script much of this work is done
already, and an analyst can write a script like that seen in figure 3.8
This script will output the text seen in figure 3.9 for each time the ex-
ample request above is done.
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1 event http_all_headers(c: connection , is_orig: bool , hlist:
mime_header_list)
2 {
3 if ( !is_orig )
4 for ( i in hlist )
5 {
6 if (hlist[i]$name == "SERVER")
7 {
8 local software = hlist[i]$value;
9 print fmt("%s on %s is running %s", c$http?$host ,
c$id$resp_h , software);
10 }
11 }
12 }
Figure 3.8: Example Bro script
1 example.com on 10.0.0.3 is running Werkzeug /0.8.1 Python /2.7.3
Figure 3.9: Example Bro script output
While the language utilized by Bro is domain-specific, it is a relatively
powerful in a network context, and features a good library of built-in func-
tions.
Bro also comes with a good number of scripts built in, allowing for
rapid deployment of many frequently wanted functions for an IDS.
Bro is configured with an initial script which includes other pack-
ages and scripts, which then provide the functionality required to ful-
fill the policy. By default this script is the local.bro script (located in
$PREFIX/share/bro/site/local.bro.
By including other scripts, such as base/protocols/http, the Bro
runtime functions are extended to do things like logging all HTTP traffic
to http.log. This is especially helpful, since HTTP request and connection
logging can provide much of the data required for writing good scripts for
detecting assets.
As an alternative to using scripts to analyze payloads, Bro also con-
tains a signature framework, much like the rule engines found in Snort
and other intrusion detection systems. This allows for efficient analysis of
payload data, which can then be escalated to the scripts by catching the
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signature_match() event.
Bro also comes with a program for parsing its own log files in the ter-
minal. This program, bro-cut, allows for parsing Bro’s formatted log files
by field names, outputting line by line in a format specified at the com-
mand line, as can be seen in figure 3.10.
1 ki@bro :/opt/bro2/logs/current$ cat http.log | bro -cut "id.
orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id.resp_p"
2 10.0.0.16 51491 108.160.162.98 80
3 10.0.0.16 51447 10.0.0.181 80
4 10.0.0.16 51447 10.0.0.181 80
5 10.0.0.16 51447 10.0.0.181 80
Figure 3.10: Example use of brocut
This allows for further analysis and lookups in historical log data, let-
ting us understand trends and seeing changes in requests over time. Since
it reads and outputs over standard input/output in the terminal, this al-
lows us to use standard unix tools like grep, cut and awk to further analyze
traffic.
When analyzing network traffic, using bro scripts and logs becomes
especially valuable. Much of the required information for writing finger-
printing scripts will be available in bro logs. This allows for analyzing
historical data to write accurate fingerprinting scripts. Likewise, actively
using the Bro engine through scripts while running and stimulating soft-
ware allows for analyzing network traffic live. Alternatively, Bro can easily
be invoked reading from a pcap file and custom scripts, allowing for easy
analysis and iterative development of signatures using captured traffic.
3.4.1 Optimizing for speed
A consideration which is important when designing a system which will
analyze realtime data is the question of speed. In a system where the ana-
lysis takes too long, the software will have to buffer traffic data for ana-
lysis when possible. If the buffers are filled, the sensor will start dropping
packets to cope. This results in a loss of data which may be important to
analysis, and gathering of asset data.
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Beyond not doing more analysis than is necessary in scripts, and redu-
cing operations which may be computationally expensive, there are two
techniques which are used when writing the scripts used in the proof of
concept made for this thesis. Both amount to the same: reduce the incom-
ing events, and abort analysis as soon as we know the event is irrelevant
for the fingerprinting script.
Using the variable is_orig, which is present in many of the events gen-
erated by the analyzers of Bro, one can determine the direction of the data
in the event when compared to the full connection flow. is_orig is true
when the event is generated on data from the originating host in the con-
nection - in other words the client. This allows us to abort early on events
where only traffic from either the server or the client in a connection is rel-
evant, and the event was triggered on the opposite side of the connection.
Another technique, more useful specifically for asset detection, is de-
fining an asset detection subnet variable and checking if the subject of the
event captured by the signature is not in this network. This way we can
avoid running analysis of the event in cases where the detected asset data is
outside the investigated subnet, since the asset data should not be gathered
for network nodes in these cases.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter of the thesis describe several methods and situations where it
is possible to gather data on assets in an organization. The chapter is di-
vided into several sections according to a stage in the previously outlined
concept of the software lifecycle. Each stage in the lifecycle contains a few
different ways of detecting some common indicators that are common to
that stage. Following these sections is a section on detecting the hostname
of clients. Finally, there is a section devoted to detecting proxy and NAT
addresses, which is a special case in that it does not apply to a single asset
but rather a network of them.
4.1 Installation
This section of the chapter describes two categories of fingerprints that oc-
cur during the installation phase of software.
4.1.1 Package managers
The concept of package managers is a prevalent concept among Linux and
BSD based operating systems. They are used to install most software from
central repositories maintained by the various groups and projects behind
the individual distributions. Since the alternative is usually to manually
configure and compile software packages, this method of installation is
usually preferred.
During the installation of software using these package managers, vari-
ous files are downloaded from the central repositories. In the examples
39
shown in figure 4.1, the requests for installation files are done over HTTP.
This is the case for many package managers. This makes it very simple to
make Bro scripts to detect the installation of software on servers utilizing
these package managers.
1 #fields client server port method hostname uri
2 10.0.0.155 137.226.34.42 80 GET cdn.debian.net
/debian/pool/main/h/htop/htop_0 .8.3-1 _amd64.deb
3 10.0.0.155 137.226.34.42 80 GET cdn.debian.net
/debian/pool/main/p/python3 .1/ python3.1-minimal_3 .1.3-1
_amd64.deb
4 10.0.0.155 137.226.34.42 80 GET cdn.debian.net
/debian/pool/main/p/python3 .1/ python3 .1_3.1.3 -1 _amd64.deb
5 10.0.0.251 193.35.52.51 80 GET no.archive.
ubuntu.com /ubuntu/pool/universe/h/htop/htop_1 .0.2 -2
_amd64.deb
6 10.0.0.22 193.35.52.51 80 GET no.archive.
ubuntu.com /ubuntu/pool/universe/m/mongodb/mongodb -dev_2
.4.6 -0 ubuntu5_amd64.deb
7 10.0.0.22 193.35.52.51 80 GET no.archive.
ubuntu.com /ubuntu/pool/universe/m/mongodb/mongodb -
clients_2 .4.6-0 ubuntu5_amd64.deb
Figure 4.1: APT-GET HTTP requests
Ideally, this allows the asset detection system to get a complete over-
view over all software installed on a system. In practice, many operating
systems will initially use files present on the installation media when in-
stalling the base system, but all later installations and updates will likely
be detected.
While it is always possible to fake such update requests, it is unlikely
that a real system will provide false positives. Since updates and installa-
tions are a necessity for most systems, such traffic will typically be correct.
In the thesis implementation of the detection script for the use of
the package manager apt-get (used by Debian derived distributions like
Ubuntu and Mint) one can parse out additional information about the sys-
tem. From the example above (which contains requests from both a Debian
and a Ubuntu based system) we can gather the Linux distribution, specific
software being installed and its version based on the requests for installa-
tion files.
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4.1.2 Installation checkin traffic
Another possible fingerprint that occurs in some software is the concept
of installation checkin. This is a behavior where software, upon being in-
stalled, will check in to the developer to notify them of installations – usu-
ally for statistics purposes.
In most cases this will yield a fingerprint of a specific software, but
sometimes the installed software will also report additional information.
1 #field client server port method hostname uri
2 10.0.0.254 195.18.221.152 80 GET subscriptions.
amd.com /driverinstalled/index.html?VID1 =1002& DID1 =6798&
PID1=AMD Radeon Graphics Processor&SSVID1 =1002& SSID1=0b00
Figure 4.2: AMD installation checkin
In the example in figure 4.2, gathered during the installation of AMD
Graphics Drivers 14.06, the request was done after installation was fin-
ished. This request does not only indicate that an AMD graphics driver
has been installed, but also what graphics card hardware is present in the
machine doing the request.
The limitation to this type of fingerprint is, as with most others, that
anyone can do the request in order to emulate the fingerprint. To the end
user there is no downside to either emulating or suppressing this type of
request, as it is only used for statistics for the vendor.
Most software that does exhibit this behavior has been seen doing this
type of callback over HTTP, and are thus usually easily detected using a
simple Bro script.
4.2 Use
This section discusses a series of asset fingerprints that occur during normal
usage of software., and how this can be used for asset detection.
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4.2.1 Greeting banners
A greeting banner is a part of the initial greeting for many protocols. The
service banner is usually sent immediately after a client has connected to a
service, and usually contains a string denoting the software version of the
server.
Among the more notable protocols where the greeting banner is present
are the SSH, FTP and SMTP protocols.
Generally, the banners will contain the software and its version, some-
times along with other information. In the example below, the banner used
by bro.example.com shows that it is an Ubuntu-based operating system
running on the server. At the same time, the ssh.example.com server is
configured to only broadcast its OpenSSH version.
p h i l i p c s $ nc ssh . example . com 22
SSH−2.0−OpenSSH_6 . 1
p h i l i p c s $ nc bro . example . com 22
SSH−2.0−OpenSSH_6 . 2 p2 Ubuntu−6
[ p h i l i p c s @ s a f i r ]~% nc smtp . uio . no 25
220 mail−mx2 . uio . no ESMTP Exim 4 . 8 0 Tue , 24 Jun 2014
1 9 : 3 0 : 5 2 +0200
Figure 4.3: Some example banners
There are some limitations to the use of banners for asset detection,
though. While the banner is present by default in many standard configur-
ations, for the major protocols the greeting is not essential to the protocol.
Therefore many system administrators decide to change the host banner in
order to not broadcast the software and version running on specific ports.
In the case of the protocols mentioned above, most of them usually have
a relatively easy way of disabling this greeting banner. OpenSSH does not
offer the possibility to do this, as the string is part of the protocol . It can, as
seen in figure 4.4, be limited to just the OpenSSH version, without the OS
identifier, by changing the DebianBanner configuration option.
These banners are generally sent during the initial connection to the ser-
vice, and are therefor possible to extract using the Bro signature framework.
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p h i l i p c s $ nc bro . example . com 22
SSH−2.0−OpenSSH_6 . 2 p2
Figure 4.4: Reduced banner information
Additionally, some of Bro’s analyzers for protocols have built in software
and version detection. Notable among these are the presence of scripts for
detection of SSH software – which includes both server and client versions.
4.2.2 User agents and plugins
Among the more easily available fingerprints in both traffic amount and
asset information amount is the use of user agents. Specifically HTTP cli-
ents are often available for analysis, given that so much of internet traffic
runs over HTTP. While other types of software also use user agents (see
OpenSSH above), HTTP clients seems to have the largest proportion of
traffic where user agents are relevant. This section will therefore mostly
deal with HTTP.
User agents usually identify the client software and version, usually so
that the server can handle traffic according to the clients’ capabilities. In the
case of HTTP clients, serving web pages according to the client type was es-
pecially prevalent during the early web browser wars, and is still used for
this as well as other purposes like serving mobile versions of webpages.
In the case of HTTP clients, the user agent will generally contain at least
a software name and its version. Many clients, however, will also serve a
wealth of other information along with this. The user agent information
gathered by Bro’s internal software framework can be seen in figure 4.5
Chrome, in the figure 4.5, will also inform the server of its operating
system and architecture, while the Valve Steam client will also inform us of
its language settings. Additionally, some clients will inform the server of
the plugins available on the client, such as the .Net library in the MSIE case
above.
While not a requirement for the HTTP protocol, specification of a user
agent is generally seen in most requests. It will be found among all the
other headers sent in each request coming from the client.
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1 #fields host software_type name version.major version
.minor version.minor2 version.minor3 version.addl
unparsed_version
2 10.0.0.16 HTTP:: BROWSER Chrome 18 0 1025
166 - Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; U; Macintosh;
en-US; Valve Steam Client /1401381906; ) AppleWebKit /535.19
(KHTML , like Gecko) Chrome /18.0.1025.166 Safari /535.19
3 10.0.0.16 HTTP:: BROWSER Chrome 35 0 1916
153 - Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X
10_9_2) AppleWebKit /537.36 (KHTML , like Gecko) Chrome
/35.0.1916.153 Safari /537.36
4 10.0.0.16 HTTP:: BROWSER Chrome 35 0 1916
153 - Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X
10_9_2) AppleWebKit /537.36 (KHTML , like Gecko) Chrome
/35.0.1916.153 Safari /537.36
5 10.0.0.16 HTTP:: BROWSER Crash% 20 - -
- Reporter /1 Crash %20 Reporter /1.0
CFNetwork /673.2.1 Darwin /13.1.0 (x86_64) (MacBookPro11 %2C3)
6 10.0.0.251 HTTP:: BROWSER Python -urllib 3 3
- - - Python -urllib /3.3
7 10.0.0.16 HTTP:: BROWSER iTerm 1 0 0
20140518 Sparkle /313 iTerm /1.0.0.20140518
Sparkle /313
8 10.0.0.168 HTTP:: BROWSER MSIE 8 0 -
- - Mozilla /4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0;
Windows NT 5.1; Trident /4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR
3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Figure 4.5: Bro software.log, abbreviated for readability
Given that the user agent string is not required for the HTTP protocol,
it is usually relatively easy for an end user to modify it (and it may, indeed,
be necessary to access some services). Given that there is relatively little
incentive for the average user to change the user agent string, and that it
is even more unlikely in a corporate setting, the user agent can generally
be trusted to contain accurate information. Since it is not essential to the
standard, however, it is important to note that any user can change this
string and not necessarily suffer service degradation.
Bro has built in support for recording the user agents of clients that it
observes sending requests.
There is also an interesting special case for user agents over HTTP.
Much modern software includes HTTP clients for doing external requests
such as web API requests and update requests. In the example list above,
the Valve Steam client implies that the Steam client from Valve software
has been used by a client. This means that the client is likely being used
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for playing video games. Such specialized software can, in other words,
identify an asset’s use cases instead of just identifying a web-browser be-
ing used for browsing.
4.2.3 Javascript libraries
The need for client side scripting in the html context has stimulated the
use of JavaScript. While the server serves as the storage and distribution of
JavaScript files, the scripts are executed in the client context.
There are a few usecases for knowing what JavaScript libraries are being
served by your organization. From a maintenance perspective, it is better
to keep the same libraries in use across products in the organization (see
the Background section on Asset Consolidation). From a security perspect-
ive, knowing that the scripts you serve your clients are not tampered with
is important in order to avoid malicious events happening due to files that
you serve. In January 2014, Spiderlabs wrote about malicious file includes
injected into JQuery library files on compromised servers. The files were
then served to the visitors of webpages using these jquery scripts, which al-
lowed for exploit kit installations on the visitors to affected webpages[11].
There is a tendency among javascript library developers to use and provide
so-called minified javascript where content is obfuscated to save space.
This technique, unfortunately, also allows an adversary to hide malicious
code in a javascript file without arousing suspicion from casual inspection
of the code.
Because the JavaScript libraries are served over the network, we can de-
tect the transfers of these files, and identify them.
In Bro, it is possible to run md5 or SHA1 hashing over files transferred
by loading frameworks/files/hash-all-files in the configuration. This
allows us to have a previously generated master list of common JavaScript
library files (or a custom one per organization generated using the asset
detection system). By comparing the hashed sum of each file transferred,
we can detect which known JavaScript files are being served.
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4.2.4 Website whitelist
Most webpages are generally divided into different files, which are being
served. Each file, such as an image, a document, JavaScript files or an ex-
ecutable can be detected during transfer.
We can use a modified version of the JavaScript solution above to detect
malicious activity. Instead of having a known list of libraries and assigning
asset information to each serving host, we can instead have a known list of
hash sums for files being served, and trigger alerts for non-registered as-
sets. Should a JavaScript file have been modified – say, to add a malicious
include – it will trigger as a non-registered asset. Should an alarm notifica-
tion be tied to this event, a compromise of the serving host can be detected.
Essentially, we are leveraging asset information to detect non-standard be-
havior of our server, and defending based on that information.
Three things limit this technique:
• There is some computational overhead to hashing all files transferred
from a larger website. To hash a file, all traffic related to the file needs
to be read into memory and analyzed by the hashing mechanism.
• Building an authoritative list of hashes can be hard – it requires
recording the states of each file at a known good state. This may
require manual analysis.
• Keeping said list updated can be even harder, especially if the
webpage is dynamic in nature – as many pages are these days.
One can limit the required computation by limiting the file types that
have to be hashed and analyzed. For instance, it is possible to limit the
hashing to only certain file types, at the cost of leaving some room for an
attacker to transfer malicious files.
Building the list can be done either on the server, by hashing all served
files manually or with scripts. Alternatively, one can use a Bro script to
record URL / hash pairs, and simply browse the webpage. Care must
be taken in ensuring that these activities are done while the files are in a
known good state.
Regardless, such an effort can be well worth the effort required in order
to avoid infecting visitors to webpages you are controlling.
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4.2.5 Server header
The Server header is a field used by HTTP servers much in the same way
as greeting banners are used by other protocols. The header is used for
statistics and promotion of the web server being used.
To an asset detection system, knowing what server software is serving
the current request is nice because many vulnerabilities will be specific to
certain web servers.
A good source for examples of these headers is HackerTarget.com’s
data[1] from crawling the Alexa Top 500k pages. It is available as a zip
file from their webpage. This data allows an analyst to take into account a
wide variety of headers when making fingerprints.
1 Server: Google Frontend
2 Server: BigIP
3 Server: Microsoft -IIS /7.5
4 Server: Apache /2.4.6 (Unix)
5 Server: Apache /2.2.15 (Red Hat)
6 Server: Ning HTTP Server 2.0
7 Server: nginx /1.4.7
8 Server: Apache /2.2.20 (Unix) mod_ssl /2.2.20 OpenSSL /0.9.8e-fips
-rhel5 mod_jk /1.2.28
Figure 4.6: Example server headers
The purpose of this header is to disclose the serving software. Some
servers will also include server versions, or even the Operating System
running the software. In figure 4.6 one server is also disclosing some of
its modules and their versions.
A system administrator can usually turn off the header with access to
the configuration files.
4.2.6 X-Powered-By header
Among many header fields used by HTTP servers is the non-standard field
X-Powered-By, which is used by many servers to tell the client which tech-
nology is being used to serve the web application that is being requested.
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This is a boon for the asset detection system. In essence, the serving
framework for the web application is exposed to us. Given that many vul-
nerabilities exist in such frameworks, knowing what is used behind each
webapp is very valuable to us.
1 X-Powered -By: UrlRewriter.NET 1.8.0
2 X-Powered -By -Plesk: PleskWin
3 X-Powered -By: PHP /5.3.27
4 X-Powered -By: Servlet 2.4; JBoss -4.2.2. GA (build: SVNTag=
JBoss_4_2_2_GA date =200710221139)/Tomcat -5.5
5 X-Powered -By: ASP.NET
Figure 4.7: Example X-Powered-By
For the most part, this header will be set to a string pair of a framework
name and a version number. As one can see in figure 4.7, some frameworks
will not expose its version, while others will have a concatenated list of sev-
eral frameworks.
This is a non-standard - but often used - header, and as such we can-
not expect to see it in all HTTP responses. Since it is not known to serve
any purpose except statistics and publicity for framework authors, system
administrators may elect to modify and remove it at will. Modifying it to
an alternate framework may be a simple attempt to create security through
obscurity. Regardless, most instances of the headers are likely to be accur-
ate.
4.2.7 Specific headers
Some frameworks also have their own specific headers. Much like the
Server and X-Powered-By headers, there are some non-standard headers
used by specific frameworks. A few can be seen in figure 4.8
We can make Bro scripts that pick up each of these fingerprints and as-
sign the corresponding software to the originating IP.
Like all previous headers, these are not essential for the HTTP protocol,
and thus carry the risk of them being modified or removed.
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1 X-Powered -By -Plesk: PleskWin
2 x-aspnet -version: 4.0.30319
3 X-Mobilized -By: WordPress Mobile Pack 1.2.
4 X-Generator: Drupal 7 (http :// drupal.org)
5 X-Drupal -Cache: HIT
6 X-Django -Cache: Yes
Figure 4.8: Example of software-specific headers
4.2.8 Filetypes
A final possibility for detecting which frameworks or execution environ-
ments a server uses is using the filenames for successfully served files.
Many websites will have a file extension indicating what file type is be-
ing requested/served.
By using file extensions that are specific to certain execution environ-
ments (.php, .aspx, .pl), we can make a reasonable guess at which environ-
ment is being used by the server.
File extensions are relatively common in use, but in later years using
htaccess and mod_rewrite rules (and other solutions depending on server
software) to prettify URLs to not include file suffixes or change how URLs
are parsed by the server. These techniques can also be used to modify the
file-extensions to stymie anyone who wants to translate from file-extension
to server environment.
In Bro, this can be detected using regular expressions over the URI of a
given response.
4.2.9 Port Usage
Software that needs to be listening for incoming connections, usually serv-
ers, typically needs to be listening on specific well known ports. As an
example, port 80/tcp will usually be reserved for web servers as a class.
Any connection by HTTP clients where only a hostname, and no port is not
specified will use port 80 as an assumption. This is typical to most software
where there is no dependency on a discovery or announcement protocol.
These well known ports can be found organized by IANA , or on many
unix systems in the file /etc/services. Ports are assigned in 3 categories:
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• System ports (0 – 1023)
• User ports (1024 – 49151)
• Dynamic/Private ports (49152 – 65535)
Ports below 1024 will generally only be available for the root/adminis-
trator user on the machines running the software. These are often seen in
connection to server software or services which run continually.
As is stated on IANA’s webpages in a disclaimer: “THE FACT THAT
NETWORK TRAFFIC IS FLOWING TO OR FROM A REGISTERED PORT
DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT IS "GOOD" TRAFFIC, NOR THAT IT NECES-
SARILY CORRESPONDS TO THE ASSIGNED SERVICE”. While ports will
usually be a good indicator of what type of software is running on a server,
it is often trivial to change what port a piece of software should be listen-
ing on. On the other hand, changes to ports will usually incur overhead of
work for both the administrator of the server software as well as the client
user, since reconfiguration must happen on both ends.
Two cases of Port usage detection have been implemented as examples
for the proof of concept in the thesis.
The first is a general port registration script, which detects TCP streams
which are established, and UDP streams that receive a response. These
ports are considered open and listening. This detection gives a general in-
dication of what software is in use on different IP addresses.
The second case is a script for registering software known to be operat-
ing on specific ports. A good example of this is the case of Dropbox, which
is known to broadcasts on port 17500/udp. Since this is a unique behavior,
and the port is not known to be used by any other software, we can assign
the software to the originating IP.
4.2.10 Registrations
Software that uses web-services as backends, such as Dropbox, will also
have to register or check in with the servers to be able to use the services
these servers provide.
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Usually, this type of behavior will include logging in or providing some
other means of authentication for services that requires this. Other services
that are not personalized will instead see traffic requesting data from the
servers, using methods such as web-apis or other ways of transferring the
information required by the application. In the case of Dropbox, the regis-
tration is done using a web request to servers belonging to Dropbox.
1 #fields client server port method hostname uri
2 10.0.0.16 108.160.163.100 80 GET notify7
.dropbox.com /subscribe?host_int=#########& ns_map
=########_############# ,########_########### ,#######_
############ ,#######_############### ,########_
############## ,########_#############& user_id =#######& nid
=####################& ts =##########
Figure 4.9: Dropbox registration request (numbers replaced with #)
It is important to be aware that this type of traffic also could be faked,
and not only for malicious purposes. In Chat Wars[4], the author retells
of his days developing the interoperability between MSN Messenger and
AOL chat, and how they imitated the protocol used between AOL clients
and AOL servers. A sufficiently good imitation would likely also fool an
asset detection system.
4.3 Update
4.3.1 Update servers
With the advent of the internet, a lot of software went over to using the
internet to update itself. Software will usually make a request to a server
under the control of the developer of the software.
A solution to detecting software was presented in Mats Erik Klepsland’s
thesis “Passive Asset Detection using NetFlow”[10], which used the IPs
that are used only for updates for specific software or operating systems to
fingerprint the presence of that software.
By finding IP addresses or hostnames that are only used for specific up-
date servers, we can separate out the clients connecting to them as having
that software or operating system installed.
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Unfortunately, there are several limitations to this. First and foremost,
the approach is rendered moot the second a server is being used for soft-
ware other than that which is expected by the script. In Klepsland’s case,
the operating system detection by update server had false positives, and
he posits that it is likely to be because of hosts with Microsoft Office in-
stalled. In other words, since the update server was not dedicated to the
single software we wish to detect, it is generating false positives. This is
why this thesis does not recommend using this approach.
4.3.2 Update URLs
Given that we are using a NIDS system to capture and analyze network
data, we also have access to packet payloads. This allows us to modify
the update server solution above, and restrict the HTTP based update re-
quests to specific software in order to avoid false positives. In most cases,
updates will follow the same pattern as outlined in the package manager
section under installation in this chapter. Some software update requests
will however add more information in its requests.
Such requests will generally contain a software-specific request for a
unified page where information about the newest software is available. Al-
ternatively, it will inform the server of its version, and let the server provide
information on the availability of updates.
1 #fields client server port method hostname uri
useragent
2 10.0.0.16 46.4.223.210 80 GET sw-update.obdev
.at /update -feeds/littlesnitch3.plist Little %20
Snitch %20 Software %20 Update /4052 CFNetwork /673.0.3 Darwin
/13.0.2 (x86_64) (MacBookPro11 %2C3)
Figure 4.10: Little Snitch update check
In figure 4.10, the Little Snitch software requests a URL meant for
all versions of the software. The webpage requested will serve an XML
formatted file which the software will parse and then present the choice of
updating to the user.
The request in figure 4.11, for the software Virtualbox, provides the
server with a platform and version number. The page returns a link to
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1 #fields client server port method hostname uri
useragent
2 10.0.0.254 137.254.60.34 80 GET update.
virtualbox.org /query.php?platform=WINDOWS_64BITS_GENERIC
&version =4.2.16 _86992&count =4& branch=stable VirtualBox
4.2.16 <win.64 [Distribution: Windows 7 Service Pack 1 |
Version: 6.1 | Build: 7601] >
Figure 4.11: VirtualBox update check
the newest version of the software, provided that it is not up to date.
Both cases can be used to derive which software is installed on the cli-
ent. Additionally, the VirtualBox case provides information on the version
of the software, as well the platform of the installed software.
Also to be noted in this case is that since the software is using a built
in HTTP client to make these requests, they have also been helpful enough
to provide us with a user agent, which in these cases sends the software
version as well as the operating system. In the case of Little Snitch it also
sends the hardware version of the physical machine it is running on.
When combining update URLs with user agents, it is possible to find
software installations with a high degree of certainty. Like all other cases,
it is possible that a client will modify traffic to inject false positives.
4.4 Hostname
A special case for asset detection is the detection of hostnames. While the
hostnames themselves are uninteresting in that they do not prove the ex-
istence of any software or other asset information, they are useful in two
ways.
First of all, the hostname is usually the more meaningful name for an
asset behind an IP. It is more human friendly, and will usually follow a
specific host, independently of new or reassigned IP addresses. In some
organizations, the hostname will be the preferred method of identifying
hosts, given that IPs will potentially change during a later DHCP renegoti-
ation.
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To a security analyst or a system administrator, the hostname can indic-
ate the function of a host during manual analysis. While it is not evidence
of a specific function, it will in many cases indicate the type of host or the
function it serves.
4.4.1 HTTP Hostnames
When making HTTP requests a client will usually indicate a specific host-
name where the resource is located. Usually, this hostname is found in the
Host header.
According to the RFC for the HTTP 1.1 standard if the URI is not an ab-
solute address, the host designated by the Host field must be a valid host
on the server. If the host is not valid, the server should return a 400 (Bad
Request) error.
This allows us to gather hostnames from all successful HTTP requests.
There are some caveats to this, though. The HTTP hostname does
not necessarily correspond to a network hostname. When using a reverse
proxy in front of several HTTP servers, the proxy will respond to requests
for all hosts it proxies. To the asset detection system, it would seem that the
proxy should be assigned the hostnames, while the proxied servers are ac-
tually the ones the hostname should correspond to in the system. In other
words, the hostname will often correspond to the canonical server host-
name, but this will not always be the case.
Another limitation is that several common servers are not totally com-
pliant to the RFC as above. Some HTTP servers will redirect the request to
a default server if the request hostname does not exist on said server, and
thus provide us with a success code instead.
In the example implementation made for this Master’s project, a script
has been set up to record Host and IP pairs on successful requests to a
server over HTTP.
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4.4.2 DHCP
DHCP is the protocol for dynamically distributing several key configura-
tions upon connecting to a network. One of the more important functions
is requesting/receiving an IP address when connecting. The protocol runs
on UDP and utilizes broadcasts of packets.
DHCP is interesting because it allows the client to specify its hostname,
and inform the DHCP server (and other listening network nodes) of it.
Such information is optionally included in a DHCP option field.
This information is useful because it tells the network (and the asset de-
tection system) the hostname by which the client identifies itself.
The limitation to this is that the client can choose its own hostname.
Unlike a DNS entry, it is not (or should not be) canonical to the rest of the
network. Additionally, as the DHCP is generally a local function, it will
not propagate outside its own network. This means that in certain network
topologies, such as the topologies often seen by ISPs and MSSPs, scripts
utilizing this information will be useless.
We can detect these settings in Bro by receiving certain events produced
by the DHCP analyzer module of Bro.
4.4.3 DNS sniffing
A final, and more canonical look upon hostnames in the context of an or-
ganization is the responses to DNS queries. The Domain Name System
allows for a translation from hostnames to IP addresses.
In our case, these hostnames are interesting whenever those using the
asset detection system do not have access to the DNS being used in an
organization. This is, for example, often the case for managed service pro-
viders. By passively detecting DNS records and their assignments, we can
build a list of domain names used in an organization.
A limitation to this approach is that a malicious client could use a ma-
licious or misconfigured DNS server to fill asset records with bogus do-
main names. Additionally, since most DNS traffic uses UDP, traffic can be
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spoofed to appear to come from an authentic DNS server.
Bro contains a DNS parser, which can be used to parse DNS responses.
4.5 Proxy/NAT detection
Another special case for asset detection is detecting IP addresses that are
either proxy or NAT addresses.
A proxy server is a server that acts as an intermediary between clients
and servers. A client will generally connect to a proxy, which will then re-
lay the request to a server. The response is then carried back to the proxy,
which relays the information to the actual client. Most proxies seen today
are web proxies, which relay HTTP requests. In a corporate environment,
web proxies are usually used to speed up requests by caching files, filter
data depending on the organizations policies on web surfing, and to allow
for security functions.
The concept of NAT addresses are most often used today for the pur-
pose of IP masquerading, that is, to hide a network of IPs behind a single
IP. Most home routers used today are used as NATing devices, hiding a
private network behind a single public IP.
Both of these concepts are important to an asset detection system be-
cause they allow a single IP to “hide” traffic coming from multiple distinct
networked hosts. A single host behind one of these systems may have up-
dated versions of software, while other hosts in the network are using vul-
nerable versions. In cases where a malicious attack targeting these vulner-
abilities are detected, it is important for the analysts to know that several
hosts reside behind that single IP, and that they have vulnerable versions of
the software – as opposed to thinking that the different records of software
versions are a product of – for instance – a host being updated from the
vulnerable version of said software to a newer version.
4.5.1 X-Forwarded-For
X-Forwarded-For is an HTTP request header inserted by various proxy
solutions. The header is not a standard header (as denoted by the X prefix),
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but is implemented in solutions such as Squid, Bluecoat and others.
Since the header is typically only present in communication going
through a proxy, this information allows us to identify an IP addresses
where it is a proxy, or one of the clients NATed behind it is a proxy.
On the originating host it is used to identify clients behind a proxy by
the end server – negating the anonymization implications of using a proxy,
while still allowing the use of proxies for other reasons.
For the asset detection system this header is useful because it allows for
identification of proxies, and because it can give indications of the network
addresses used behind the proxy.
Like several other techniques presented previously in this chapter,
scripts to detect this behavior will only have to consider HTTP headers.
As such, it is relatively trivial to implement. The presence of X-Forwarded-
For indicates a proxy host, while the IP(s) set by the header can optionally
be used to map out the network behind the proxy IP.
4.5.2 Proxy specific headers
Much like the behavior of some software and frameworks described pre-
viously in this thesis, some proxies have their own specific headers. These
are usually appended to the list of headers to support specific functions in
the software.
In the case of the proxy vendor Bluecoat, there is use of a specific
header: X-Bluecoat-Via. This header is used to detect loops in the network,
potentially stopping a circle of proxies forwarding to each other .
The presence of this header can be used by our asset detection system
to indicate the presence of a Bluecoat proxy behind an IP.
4.5.3 Mutually exclusive OS/Software
A final effort to detect proxy or NAT hosts is to leverage previously
gathered asset information rather than just the traffic passing through cur-
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rently. By finding the use of mutually exclusive asset information, we can
infer when different systems are behind an IP.
One method of detecting reverse proxies behind IP addresses is finding
different server software using the same ports. Port 80/tcp (HTTP) sim-
ultaneously serving traffic from both an apache and an IIS server is a sure
indication that there is some form of reverse proxy being used in front of
multiple servers.
Another method, this one for detecting NATed or proxied hosts is by
detecting the presence of several mutually exclusive Operating Systems.
Both linux and windows user agents are a good indication that either the
host is used as a NATing host, proxy, or that a client is spoofing traffic.
Because this detection method is not done over network data, but rather
over gathered asset data, detection like this should not be done in Bro, as
that would cause too big of a burden memory-wise. In a system like the
example implementation done in this thesis, the process inserting new as-
set data into the database backend would have done this, as much of the
information will be looked up at insert time anyways. Alternatively, this
effort could be done asynchronously by a separate process dedicated to it-
erating through the database and detecting mutually exclusive OS or soft-
ware.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
5.1 Method of evaluation
The goal of the evaluation was to test if the proof of concept based on
the techniques described in this thesis could effectively detect assets. This
chapter is dedicated to investigating the research question regarding how
gathering asset data works in practice. To this end, I have chosen to evalu-
ate the system in a network that is largely unknown to me.
5.1.1 Evaluation environment and execution
The data used to evaluate the efficiency of the system created during this
project was taken from an office network. The traffic was captured over 72
hours, from noon on a Wednesday to noon the following Saturday.
The dataset is approximately 280GB of dumped traffic, divided into
2GB files. Each of these files correspond to a data point on the graphs
following in this chapter. The difference in rate of data transfer during
different times of day is why there is variable spacing between points on
the graphs.
All traffic was captured using the program dumpcap, running on a com-
puter with traffic spanned from a switch in the evaluation environment.
The environment is known to be mixed OS-wise, containing hosts using
both Linux and Windows.
The asset collection sensor was configured to only detect assets belong-
ing to the client IP subnet. This way, asset information for external hosts
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is not generated, and the task of verifying the asset information is made
simpler. It is also important to note that there is a varying amount of de-
tail in the fingerprints, and that therefore new entries in the database are
generated when a signature detects differing levels of detail. This is espe-
cially easy to identify in the case of OS detection, where many of the sig-
natures are limited to only identifying the OS family (Windows/Linux/OS
X), while other fingerprints identify version as well. The signatures used in
the evaluation can be seen in table 5.1.
The traffic was replayed to the sensor over an interface to get a real-
istic look at the performance of the rules implemented. The traffic was
replayed using the tool tcpreplay, which allows replay of packet dumps
over a network interface at specified speeds. Using a set speed of 150Mbps,
the sensor had minimal packet loss (less than 0.3% at its highest).
Fingerprint name Capability
assets_apt-get.bro Detects ubuntu/debian (and some other) ver-
sions from update urls using distro codenames.
assets_apt-get_update.bro Detects Debian derived linux package installa-
tions using apt-get.
assets_fedora.bro Detects fedora version from update checks.
assets_fedora_update.bro Detects fedora package installations using
yum.
bro_softwaredetect.bro Bridges with Bro’s built in user agent and
server banner facilities.
dns_hostnames.bro Detects hostname assignment from DNS re-
sponses.
dropbox_broadcast.bro Detects dropbox LAN sync communication.
Not useful in evaluation due to dropbox not
being installed in environment.
dropbox_register.bro Detects dropbox registering to web-server.
http_banner.bro Saves Server: headers from HTTP responses
http_hostname.bro Registers hostname from successful HTTP re-
quests.
js_hashcheck.bro Detects versions of jquery being transferred
using hash. Not useful in this test, as all
javascript files were cached (returned 304 Not
Modified).
ports.bro Detects port usage under port 1024.
windows_onlinecheck.bro Detects windows installations from online-
check.
Table 5.1: Fingerprints used during evaluation of the proof of concept
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5.2 Results
In all the following graphs, we see the initial learning phase of the system as
it comes online. The reason for this is the same as was seen in Klepsland’s
thesis[10]: that the system is initialized and immediately detects many of
the hosts which continuously communicate.
While the same hosts may continue to be detected by the system over
the course of the sensor’s running time, they will not be registered as new
asset. As assets are found over time, the rate of new entries will decline
until there are changes in the environment, such as new hosts, services or
updates.
5.2.1 Host detection
The host detection rate is based on the other types of asset information. A
host is not registered in the system until there is tangible information about
it. The times at which new hosts were detected by the system can be seen
in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: New hosts detected over 3 days, red arrows indicate midnight,
blue arrows indicate mid-day
The new entries for hosts are clustered around the working hours on
the working days, which is reasonable given that this is the time when
non-automated software is communicating over the network.
In total, 84 hosts were detected during the evaluation period of the tool.
This includes some servers in the IP range as well as clients.
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5.2.2 OS detection
The OS detection is based on 3 different techniques spread over 5 finger-
print rules. A total of 43 entries spread over 16 hosts were found.
28 entries were based on the softwaredetect.bro rule, based on find-
ing indicators of client OS using strings found in user agents reported by
Bro.
10 entries were based on software updates for Ubuntu and Fe-
dora, detected by assets_apt-get.bro, assets_apt-get_update.bro and
assets_fedora_update.bro
A final set of 5 entries were based on windows_onlinecheck.bro, which
detects Windows hosts connecting to the domain Windows hosts use to de-
tect online connectivity.
Figure 5.2: New Operating systems detected over 3 days, red arrow
indicate midnight, blue arrows indicate mid-day
Beyond the initial spike in the learning period, the statistics show con-
centrated instances of new operating systems being seen in the morning
hours on the second day, as well as a small spike on the third day. The fi-
nal two detection instances are around midnight and 8 in the morning, and
coincide with shift changes, where new software with better indications of
OS versions were detected.
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5.2.3 Software detection
Software detection is based on 4 fingerprint rules. A total of 317 entries
spread over 50 hosts were found.
20 entries were based on http_banner.bro, which operates using the
Server: header field in HTTP communication. This script overlaps with
the detection capabilities provided by the Bro software framework.
193 entries over 48 hosts were found based on bro_softwaredetect.bro,
which detects user agent strings as well as server banners.
26 entries were found based on assets_apt-get.bro. These were for a
single update and correspond to the spike seen on the third day.
78 entries were found based on assets_fedora.bro. These were for a
two machines doing updates/installations and the larger of these installa-
tion sessions correspond to the spike seen on the final day.
Figure 5.3: New software detected over 3 days, red arrow indicate
midnight, blue arrows indicate mid-day
As with the OS statistics, we see clusters starting around 8 o’clock in the
morning, continuing out the working day.
Additionally, as mentioned above, there are two big spikes in detec-
ted software in the morning on friday and saturday. These are software
updates, and operating systems such as Windows and some linux distri-
butions are known to do automatic updates at night by default if enabled.
This lets the machines avoid using time and network bandwidth during
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operating hours. Two spikes during the first night night are also attribut-
able to updates, there due to user agents related to Windows updates.
One lesson which can be drawn from this is that the some of the most
informative asset information is only available sporadically. Should the
timespan of surveillance be expanded, we can expect more software up-
dates to improve our asset information.
5.2.4 Hostname detection
Hostname detection is based on 2 different techniques, DNS and HTTP host
header. A total of 79 entries spread over 57 hosts were found.
58 entries were based on dns_hostnames.bro, over 51 hosts. As the
name implies, this script detects DNS responses and assigns hostnames ac-
cordingly.
21 entries based on http_hostname.bro, over 15 hosts. This signature
detects successful HTTP requests, and records the Host: header used by
the requesting client.
Figure 5.4: New hostnames detected over 3 days, red arrows indicate
midnight, blue arrows indicate mid-day
The detection of hostnames were, as with the other classes of detected
assets, mostly driven by traffic generated during working hours in the en-
vironment.
There is some traffic related to automated traffic during the night hours
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the first night, but no more is detected in later nights due to the hostnames
already being discovered by then.
5.2.5 Port detection
Portname detection is based on ports.bro, which detects tcp and udp ports
under 1025 responding to connections. A total of 88 entries spread over 50
hosts were found.
Figure 5.5: New ports detected over 3 days, red arrows indicate midnight,
blue arrows indicate mid-day
Like all the other categories, new port detections also generally only
occur during working hours.
5.3 Data presentation
As part of the proof of concept program made for this project, I made a web
interface to look up asset data gathered based on individual hosts. The web
interface consists of a simple lookup form where one can enter the unique
id for the asset being we wish for asset information about, and a display
where asset information is presented for the requested hosts upon submit-
ting the form.
The information is presented in a table view, with most of the fields
from the asset database exposed for each entry. The only field which was
not exposed here (beyond entry id) was the raw data on which the initial
entry was based. It is likely desirable that this information is available to
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Figure 5.6: Asset detection results presented in a web view
analysts in a more developed system.
An example lookup in this can be seen in figure 5.6. The figure shows
a host running 2 virtual machines. The Ubuntu virtual machine has in this
case also downloaded updates from the internet, and these have been re-
gistered to this asset as installed.
The asset viewer is part of a multi-mode script developed for the proof
of concept. The script, assetweb.py, has three modes.
The first mode, invoked with python ./assetweb.py –mode makedb,
initializes a sqlite database based on the schema described in the script.
This database is stored as assets.db in the current working directory, and
is where the asset data is stored.
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The second mode, invoked with python ./assetweb.py –mode bro,
runs the script in a mode which connects to a local Bro instance using the
library broccoli, which allows for sending and receiving events from Bro.
This is the mode in which asset data is transferred from events in the Bro
engine to the database.
The third mode, invoked with python ./assetweb.py –mode web, res-
ults in a web server being run on port 5000/tcp on the local host. This
serves the web interface seen in figure 5.6, as well as an API serving json
formatted asset data.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Quick PRADS comparison
PRADS is a passive asset detection system, designed along the same lines
as p0f, which was mentioned in the Background chapter. PRADS has sup-
port for OS detection through TCP/IP stack fingerprinting, as well as sup-
port for OS version detection through Server strings.
When compared to the system shown in the evaluation chapter, PRADS
has a marked advantage in the cases of detecting OS versions installed on
servers. The server OS identification through server banner was not imple-
mented in the proof of concept ruleset, which led to no OS being identified
for any of the dedicated servers encountered. The information was stored
in the host banner, and in cases where the OS or distribution was leaked in
this variable it was still available to an analyst in the asset system, but the
machine was not marked as an host using a specified operating system.
The disadvantage for PRADS lies in some inaccuracies in OS, such as a
Windows 7 host which was identified as a Windows XP/2000 and an OS
X machine being identified as an iPhone. There were also instances where
PRADS ended up with unknown OS fingerprints, but where the evaluated
system detected OS version from the user agent strings and from Windows
checking for the Microsoft online connectivity check server. Since PRADS
uses packet fingerprinting, the linux hosts were only identified by a kernel
version - and in the case of this dataset only by "Linux 2.6". On all hosts
identified to a specific distribution release - where kernel version is avail-
able - the machines were running a later kernel than Linux 3.0.
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One definitive advantage to PRADS is that it tags what ports a machine
is a client for, which is not done by the prototype system. This type of in-
formation could be useful to profile the host type.
6.2 Comparison to proxy/HTTP logs
Of the fingerprints detected by the asset detection system, many could po-
tentially have been executed with log analysis of HTTP related logs instead
of IDS analysis. Log sources that could provide this type of information are
not unusual, and can be provided by solutions such as most proxies, Bro
IDS or Suricata.
These logs usually include both user agents for the clients, as well as
URLs requested. Due to the vast amount of data that is transferred over
HTTP these days, analysis of these logs can provide us with much of the
same asset information as that seen implemented in the Implementation
chapter of this thesis.
A major advantage of using these types of logs is that we have the pos-
sibility of analyzing data from many alternate sensor types. Many organ-
izations do not necessarily have the wish or the resources to deploy an IDS
for asset detection purposes, but the use of proxies is widespread. By using
the proxy-related logs organizations can get asset detection technology at a
lower cost than what may initially be assumed.
Another advantage of using this type of analysis is that it can be done
offline, and can easily be parallelized for performance. Since this analysis
is done across logs, historical data can be gathered and analyzed at later
dates. This includes using new signatures on older data to gather asset
data from times when the rules were not created.
By moving to only analyzing data from these types of logs we also avoid
some of the privacy implications of analyzing more data than necessary in
the payload of packets. While plain URLs do have privacy implications too,
much of what most people consider to be sensitive information is usually
the data which is transferred in the body of messages. Examples of in-
formation that would not be available to the log-based utilities mentioned
above, but available to the payload-scrutinizing systems, is the content of
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HTTP POST messages and unencrypted web pages.
By moving the analysis to these types of logs, we do however lose some
of the possibilities of gathering data from the content in the payload of the
packets sent, but we still have the possibility of employing many of the
same asset detection rules presented in this thesis in other environments as
well.
6.3 Learning another language to make use of the tool
An issue with using Bro for asset detection is that an analyst wishing
to make signatures will need knowledge of the domain-specific language
used in Bro scripts. While the language is not very different from other
programming languages, the use of a domain-specific language can be an
additional hurdle to overcome to someone interested in this type of asset
detection system.
This problem is offset by good documentation of the use and devel-
opment of Bro scripts found in the Documentation section on the Bro
webpage. There is a basic introduction to the features of the programming
language for Bro, accompanied by several examples of bro scripts.
There is also a section listing the events that are generated by the differ-
ent analyzers present Bro, along with documentation on the data types and
structures used by them. An example of this documentation can be seen
in figure 6.1. The availability of this type of information, along with easy
lookups of data structures - such as the connection structure seen in the
example - by means of hypertext links, the process of writing new rules is
greatly simplified.
6.4 Decaying Asset information
Another concept which has not been taken into account so far in the thesis,
but which should be considered when implementing a passive asset detec-
tion system is the decay of asset information.
Because the network and the assets running on it is dynamic, we must
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Figure 6.1: Example of bro event documentation for dhcp release event
take into account the fact that data about our assets can and will become
outdated.
The dynamic nature of computer networks and assets on them mani-
fests itself in several ways, which must be taken into account by a user of
asset detection systems.
6.4.1 Changes in assets
The primary way the dynamic nature of computer networks and the assets
on them has to be taken into account is the possibility of changes in config-
uration, software or even hardware.
Software updates, as an example, are usually encouraged or even man-
datory to users of workstations in places that have a security policy.
Depending on the software used by the organization, and the update
schedule for said software, a limited time can pass before an asset database
must be considered to be out of date.
6.4.2 Changing IP address
Dynamic DHCP also affects the asset inventory list. In most networks the
use of an IP address as a primary key in the asset database would be the
natural choice, but should IP addresses be handed out randomly for assets
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we wish to track, then it might be necessary to use alternative unique iden-
tifiers to tie together information. What such IDs should be is dependent
on the organization, sensor placement and other factors, but some poten-
tial alternatives that may fulfill the requirements are MAC addresses and
hostnames.
6.4.3 Timestamps, versions and decay
One potential solution to defeat normal changes in the network is to record
timestamps for each registered event containing asset information. By hav-
ing a record of when an asset was last seen, the information can be allowed
to decay, and automatically prune such information when it is thought to
be outdated.
The policy for such decay will vary from organization to organization,
depending on how quickly asset information is thought to change under
normal circumstances. As an example of this, update strategies for Oper-
ating Systems and software will vary from organization to organization,
depending on needs. While some organizations run updates as they be-
come available, other organizations may employ strategies where they test
updates for a limited amount of machines before rolling them out organ-
ization wide. Another alternative is to stagger the updates between fall-
back environments, ensuring that if there is a critical bug or change, both
primary and secondary environments are not disabled.
Another possibility is to use the upgraded software version numbers
being registered to the same assets as an update of the software, and re-
move or update the previous records. When IP addresses are used as the
unique identifier in an asset detection database, it is important that such
deletions are not done to assets where there is a potential for the IP acting
as a proxy or NAT address.
6.5 Opportunistic Security and general encryption
An issue that is rapidly gaining relevance with the increased demands of
security for the Internet is the use of HTTPS and other technologies to
provide end-to-end encryption for client/server connections.
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Efforts, such as the HTTPS everywhere plugin[7], encourage users to
use HTTPS for most connections to ensure that encryption (and other HT-
TPS provided security services) is provided immediately upon connecting
to servers.
Other efforts, such as the standardization process for HTTP/2[6], have
considered adding mandatory encryption to all implementations using the
standard. In a response to concerns of pervasive monitoring of internet
traffic, there have been published drafts on the concept of opportunistic
security in the forum of IETF [8]. These drafts specifically mention oppor-
tunistically encrypting connections when both endpoints allow for it.
While all of these efforts are likely to be good for the security of most
of the Internet, it also presents a problem to implementations of network
traffic sniffing for benign purposes, like network intrusion detection for
previously unencrypted traffic – and of course for systems like that which
is described in this thesis.
Figure 6.2: Simplified SSL proxy communication diagram
As can be expected, possibilities for removing encryption from commu-
nication streams are limited. In larger, managed environments it is possible
to make use of trusted certificates and proxies like those delivered by Blue-
Coat[5] to intercept encrypted communication. By intercepting HTTPS re-
quests, the proxy can take over as the man-in-the-middle (see figure 6.2),
negotiating the traffic between client and external server. The proxy ne-
gotiates the HTTPS encryption to the external server, but provides its own
certificate to the internal client. The proxy can then decrypt the data re-
ceived from the server,provide security sevices on the content of the data
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stream, before re-encrypting the data stream for delivery to the client.
6.6 Privacy - in memory analysis vs. logs
As mentioned previously, it is possible to do much of the same analysis de-
scribed throughout this thesis by analyzing common log entries made by
proxies or IDS solutions like Bro and Suricata.
This does, however, have some privacy implications. Using custom Bro
scripts to do analysis on the traffic directly allows us to avoid storing these
logs over longer time periods – or storing them at all. All sensitive data is
only present in the memory of the sensor for a limited time until the data of
the transfer is purged. HTTP logs are especially vulnerable to this, as whole
web surfing sessions are stored and searchable. Such metadata allows for
profiling of individual web surfers, and will by many be considered to be
highly intrusive.
Instead only data that is relevant to the asset detection database should
be kept over longer periods.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and future work
7.1 Goal fullfillment
Several research questions were presented in the introduction of this thesis.
While I am hopeful that the information in the chapters following the
introduction, I will also summarize my findings in this section.
• Q1) How can we design an asset detection system based on an IDS,
such as Bro?
• A1) This thesis has explored and presented several methods of
gathering fingerprints. In chapter 3, several methods of gathering
network-based fingerprints for assets was presented, demonstrating
some of the potential uses of information available to an IDS-based
asset detection system.
• Q2) How practical is the process of collecting and using fingerprints
in an IDS context?
• A2) In the Implementation chapter of the thesis, using the software
life cycle, we demonstrated a range of categories where fingerprints
could be found. The implementation presented in chapter 5, based
on a selection of these fingerprints, shows that it is possible to design
a usable system for asset detection and management of this type of
information. We have shown that we have access to a wider variety
of information than most other passive asset detection systems, by
utilizing the additional information available to IDS systems. How
labor intensive the research and development of signatures are will
vary, from very specific signatures only able to cover a single type of
software to signatures able to detect all software installed on a host
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like the assets_fedora.bro script included in the appendix. The
return of investment will of usually be lower on the former type of
signature.
• Q3) What is the practical possible coverage of this type of system?
• A3) While the proof of concept system was limited in its coverage
of assets, it demonstrated the potential for increased coverage when
compared to classical passive asset detection. The possibly best
illustration of the potential coverage which can be attained using IDS-
based asset detection of software was shown in the rules for parsing
apt-get and yum installations, which can potentially cover up to 100%
of software installations using these systems. In most cases, the only
likely omissions will be installations using offline media, compiling
from source code or software installed prior to the asset detection was
started.
7.2 Future work
As will often be the case when finishing a Master’s project, I have dis-
covered several ways in which the studied concept could be expanded and
improved. This section lists some of the ways the use of an asset detection
system based on payload data can be expanded and improved.
7.2.1 Expanded ruleset
Due to the time limitations for my Master’s project, a full set of signatures
for all software could not be defined. It is in the nature of a dynamic soft-
ware ecosystem like that we have today that signatures will either be out-
dated or cease to exist in the first place, as new software versions and en-
tirely new software is released.
Any asset detection system will likely need continuous development
as new software is made available to the organization. Much like with
Network IDS signatures, the ruleset will need expansion as new assets are
required to be detected.
In the case of this project, there was only time to make a subset of rules
as examples of what can be detected. Beyond the general lack of coverage
for all software, the developed ruleset is lacking the presence of signatures
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for specialty hardware like printers, network attached cameras and spe-
cialty software, which was not available to me.
7.2.2 Correlation rules
One type of rule that only got limited coverage in this thesis was the
concept of correlation rules. By this I mean rules that use data points
gathered over time to make assumptions about assets. In the Implement-
ation chapter the concept was suggested for detecting NATed networks
through mutually exclusive assets such as Operating Systems.
Other rules of this type can be very interesting, and should be subject to
deeper investigation. One concept that could prove useful is making pro-
files of ports that are open by default in different operating systems. This
is mostly specific to windows, where several services are on by default, but
could also prove interesting to detect specific hardware that may have sets
of odd default ports too.
7.2.3 Tools for rule creation
Another sorely lacking area is tools to analyze network traffic and to make
signatures from them. While a few possible tools were presented in the
design chapter of the thesis, I could not find a tool dedicated specifically to
making the kind of signatures necessary for asset detection.
A tool which could compare and contrast network traffic between ses-
sions, such as URLs requested or ports and hosts communicated with could
be invaluable, not only to asset detection systems but also other purposes
like gathering malware indicators and other indicators of compromise.
Another tool that could be helpful for projects like that presented in
this thesis is the development of a unified asset detection rule language.
This would allow a shared ruleset, even with different engines to detect the
data. As mentioned in the discussion chapter, it is possible to do many of
the things done in this thesis over logging sources instead, and a unified
ruleset that could be used in both types of tools would ensure that organ-
izations with different toolsets and data sources could still share the effort
required to make an adequate sets of rules.
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7.2.4 Ruleset validation
There is also a lack of tools and data sets to develop and validate rules.
Many of the publically available datasets are scrubbed of payload data and
anonymized before release to the public.
Public pcap captures of real or simulated network along with an accom-
panying list of hardware, software and other asset information could be
very useful for following research and development. However, one must
be aware that such captures will only remain relevant for a limited time be-
fore updates to software and hardware will render much of the data about
components in the captured network as no longer representative of real
networks.
Preconfigured sets of virtual machines covering different OS installa-
tions can also be very useful for the same purpose, giving an interactive
and modifiable network of hosts for a researcher to investigate. The prac-
ticality of shared sets of virtual machines like this may be limited, given
licensing requirements for commercial OSes like Windows and OS X.
7.2.5 IDS correlation
As has been suggested in the Background chapter, it is possible to use the
data gathered as a part of an asset detection system to configure or optimize
the ruleset used in an IDS solution, or alternatively to escalate IDS events
when the combination of rule and asset information makes it more likely
to be a possible event. Given how many false positives IDS systems may
have, it is important to reduce the amount of events that must be analyzed
by the limited amount of analysts available.
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Appendix A
Explanation of acronyms and
expressions
Word Definition
Asset Something of value to an organization. Can be
computer hardware, communications facilities,
buildings, information / data or software.
Bro An open source IDS system.
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.
Fingerprint An indicator of an asset’s identity.
HKEYS Entries in Microsoft Widows’ registry
IDS and IPS Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion Pre-
vention System.
IOC Indicator of Compromise.
ISP Internet Service Provider.
ISS Internet Security Systems. Produces several
security products, including IPS products.
MAC Address Media Access Control address.
MSSP Managed Security Service Provider.
NAT Network Address Translation.
Network node A specific device on a network.
NMAP Network Mapper, an active network mapping
tool.
OSI model Open Systems Interconnection model, a model
describing network layers.
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project.
p0f Passive traffic fingerprinting software, utilizing
TCP/IP stack fingerprints.
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Word Definition
PRADS Passive Real-time Asset Detection System.
Snort An open source IDS system.
Suricata An open source IDS system.
SYN, SYN+ACK Synchronize, Synchronize+Acknowledge. Ini-
tial parts of the TCP handshake.
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Appendix B
Source Code
This chapter of the appendix contains the source code for the program
responsible for retrieving, storing and displaying asset data. This is fol-
lowed by the bridge.bro script, which sets up the listening port in bro and
defines some events useful for logging assets. Finally, I have included a
script which detects Fedora installations, and records these events using
the events listed in bridge.bro.
The python script has some requirements not native to python2: flask,
flask-sqlalchemy and broccoli-python.
B.1 assetweb.py
1 from flask import Flask , render_template
2 from flask.ext.sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy
3 from broccoli import *
4 from time import sleep
5 import json
6 from optparse import OptionParser
7 import signal , sys
8
9 app = Flask(__name__)
10 app.config[’SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI ’] = ’sqlite :///./ assets.
db’
11 db = SQLAlchemy(app)
12
13 class Stats ():
14 def __init__(self):
15 self.os = 0
16 self.software = 0
17 self.hostnames = 0
18 self.proxy = 0
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19 self.ports = 0
20 self.node = 0
21
22 def __str__(self):
23 return "[stats]: node = %i, os = %i, software = %i,
hostnames = %i, proxy = %i, ports = %i" % (self.
node , self.os , self.software , self.hostnames ,
self.proxy , self.ports)
24
25 stats = Stats ()
26
27 class Node(db.Model):
28 id = db.Column(db.Integer , primary_key=True)
29 ip_address = db.Column(db.String (120) , unique=True)
30 canonical_hostname = db.Column(db.String (120), unique=
False)
31
32 def serialize(self):
33 retval = {}
34 retval["ip"] = self.ip_address
35 retval["canonical_hostname"] = self.
canonical_hostname
36 retval["software"] = [x.serialize () for x in self.
software]
37 retval["os"] = [x.serialize () for x in self.os]
38 retval["hostnames"] = [x.serialize () for x in self.
hostnames]
39 retval["ports"] = [x.serialize () for x in self.ports
]
40 retval["proxynat"] = [x.serialize () for x in self.
proxynat]
41 return retval
42
43 def __init__(self , ip , hostname=None):
44 self.ip_address = ip
45 self.canonical_hostname = hostname
46
47 def __repr__(self):
48 return ’<Node %r>’ % self.ip_address
49
50
51 class OS(db.Model):
52 id = db.Column(db.Integer , primary_key=True)
53 name = db.Column(db.String (120))
54 version = db.Column(db.String (120))
55 arch = db.Column(db.String (20))
56 source_script = db.Column(db.String (120))
57 unparsed = db.Column(db.Text)
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58 counter = db.Column(db.Integer)
59
60 assetnode_id = db.Column(db.Integer , db.ForeignKey(’node
.id’))
61 assetnode = db.relationship(’Node’,
62 backref=db.backref(’os’, lazy=’dynamic ’))
63
64 def __init__(self , name , version , arch , source_script ,
unparsed , assetnode):
65 self.name = name
66 self.version = version
67 self.arch = arch
68 self.source_script = source_script
69 self.unparsed = unparsed
70 self.assetnode = assetnode
71 self.counter = 1
72
73 def serialize(self):
74 retval = {}
75 retval["name"] = self.name
76 retval["version"] = self.version
77 retval["arch"] = self.arch
78 retval["source_script"] = self.source_script
79 retval["counter"] = self.counter
80 return retval
81
82 def __repr__(self):
83 return ’<OS %r>’ % self.name
84
85 def __eq__(self , other):
86 return self.name == other.name and self.version ==
other.version and self.version == other.version
87
88
89 class Software(db.Model):
90 id = db.Column(db.Integer , primary_key=True)
91 name = db.Column(db.String (120))
92 version = db.Column(db.String (120))
93 source_script = db.Column(db.String (120))
94 unparsed = db.Column(db.Text)
95 counter = db.Column(db.Integer)
96
97 assetnode_id = db.Column(db.Integer , db.ForeignKey(’node
.id’))
98 assetnode = db.relationship(’Node’,
99 backref=db.backref(’software ’, lazy=’dynamic ’))
100
101 def __init__(self , name , version , source_script ,
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unparsed , assetnode):
102 self.name = name
103 self.version = version
104 self.source_script = source_script
105 self.unparsed = unparsed
106 self.assetnode = assetnode
107 self.counter = 1
108
109 def serialize(self):
110 retval = {}
111 retval["name"] = self.name
112 retval["version"] = self.version
113 retval["source_script"] = self.source_script
114 retval["counter"] = self.counter
115 return retval
116
117 def __eq__(self , other):
118 return self.name == other.name and self.version ==
other.version
119
120 def __repr__(self):
121 return ’<Software %r>’ % self.name
122
123
124 class Hostname(db.Model):
125 id = db.Column(db.Integer , primary_key=True)
126 hostname = db.Column(db.String (120))
127 source_script = db.Column(db.String (120))
128 unparsed = db.Column(db.Text)
129 counter = db.Column(db.Integer)
130
131 assetnode_id = db.Column(db.Integer , db.ForeignKey(’node
.id’))
132 assetnode = db.relationship(’Node’,
133 backref=db.backref(’hostnames ’, lazy=’dynamic ’))
134
135 def __init__(self , hostname , source_script , unparsed ,
assetnode):
136 self.hostname = hostname
137 self.source_script = source_script
138 self.unparsed = unparsed
139 self.assetnode = assetnode
140 self.counter = 1
141
142 def serialize(self):
143 retval = {}
144 retval["hostname"] = self.hostname
145 retval["source_script"] = self.source_script
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146 retval["counter"] = self.counter
147 return retval
148
149 def __eq__(self , other):
150 return self.hostname == other.hostname and self.
source_script == other.source_script
151
152 def __repr__(self):
153 return ’<Hostname %r>’ % self.hostname
154
155
156 class Ports(db.Model):
157 id = db.Column(db.Integer , primary_key=True)
158 port = db.Column(db.String (20))
159 unparsed = db.Column(db.Text)
160 source_script = db.Column(db.String (120))
161 counter = db.Column(db.Integer)
162
163 assetnode_id = db.Column(db.Integer , db.ForeignKey(’node
.id’))
164 assetnode = db.relationship(’Node’,
165 backref=db.backref(’ports ’, lazy=’dynamic ’))
166
167 def __init__(self , port , source_script , unparsed ,
assetnode):
168 self.port = port
169 self.source_script = source_script
170 self.unparsed = unparsed
171 self.assetnode = assetnode
172 self.counter = 1
173
174 def serialize(self):
175 retval = {}
176 retval["port"] = self.port
177 retval["source_script"] = self.source_script
178 retval["counter"] = self.counter
179 return retval
180
181 def __eq__(self , other):
182 return self.port == other.port
183
184 def __repr__(self):
185 return ’<Port %r>’ % self.port
186
187 class ProxyNat(db.Model):
188 id = db.Column(db.Integer , primary_key=True)
189 proxysoftware = db.Column(db.String (120))
190 unparsed = db.Column(db.Text)
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191 source_script = db.Column(db.String (120))
192 counter = db.Column(db.Integer)
193
194 assetnode_id = db.Column(db.Integer , db.ForeignKey(’node
.id’))
195 assetnode = db.relationship(’Node’,
196 backref=db.backref(’proxynat ’, lazy=’dynamic ’))
197
198 def __init__(self , proxysoftware , source_script ,
unparsed , assetnode):
199 self.proxysoftware = proxysoftware
200 self.source_script = source_script
201 self.unparsed = unparsed
202 self.assetnode = assetnode
203 self.counter = 1
204
205 def serialize(self):
206 retval = {}
207 retval["proxysoftware"] = self.proxysoftware
208 retval["source_script"] = self.source_script
209 retval["counter"] = self.counter
210 return retval
211
212 def __eq__(self , other):
213 return self.proxysoftware == other.proxysoftware
214
215 def __repr__(self):
216 return ’<ProxyNat %r>’ % self.proxysoftware
217
218
219 def detected_node(ip_address , hostname=None):
220 node = Node(ip_address , hostname)
221 stats.node += 1
222 db.session.add(node)
223 db.session.commit ()
224 return node
225
226 def get_node(ip_address):
227 node = Node.query.filter_by(ip_address=ip_address).first
()
228 if node == None:
229 node = detected_node(ip_address)
230 return node
231
232 #global detected_software: event(ip: addr , software: string ,
version: string , raw: string , source_script: string);
233 @event
234 def detected_software(ip, software , version , raw ,
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source_script):
235 node = get_node(ip)
236 s = Software(software , version , source_script , raw , None
)
237 found = False
238 for i in node.software:
239 if s == i:
240 i.counter += 1
241 found = True
242 if not found:
243 s = Software(software , version , source_script , raw ,
node)
244 stats.software += 1
245 db.session.add(s)
246 db.session.commit ()
247
248 print("%-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s" % (
source_script , "Detected software", ip, software ,
version))
249
250 #global detected_os: event(ip: addr , os: string , version:
string , arch: string , raw: string , source_script: string
);
251 @event
252 def detected_os(ip , os , version , arch , raw , source_script):
253 node = get_node(ip)
254 s = OS(os, version , arch , source_script , raw , None)
255 found = False
256 for i in node.os:
257 if s == i:
258 i.counter += 1
259 found = True
260 if not found:
261 s = OS(os, version , arch , source_script , raw , node)
262 stats.os += 1
263 db.session.add(s)
264 db.session.commit ()
265 print("%-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s" % (
source_script , "Detected OS", ip , os, version))
266
267 #global detected_port: event(ip: addr , open_port: port , raw:
string , source_script: string);
268 @event
269 def detected_port(ip , open_port , raw , source_script):
270 node = get_node(ip)
271 s = Ports(open_port , source_script , raw , None)
272 found = False
273 for i in node.ports:
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274 if s == i:
275 i.counter += 1
276 found = True
277 if not found:
278 s = Ports(open_port , source_script , raw , node)
279 stats.ports += 1
280 db.session.add(s)
281 db.session.commit ()
282 print("%-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s" % (
source_script , "Detected used port", ip, open_port))
283
284 #global detected_hostname: event(ip: addr , hostname: string ,
raw: string , source_script: string);
285 @event
286 def detected_hostname(ip, hostname , raw , source_script):
287 node = get_node(ip)
288 s = Hostname(hostname , source_script , "unparsed", None)
289 found = False
290 for i in node.hostnames:
291 if s == i:
292 i.counter += 1
293 found = True
294 if not found:
295 s = Hostname(hostname , source_script , raw , node)
296 stats.hostnames += 1
297 db.session.add(s)
298 db.session.commit ()
299 print("%-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s" % (
source_script , "Detected responding hostname", ip ,
hostname))
300
301 #global detected_proxynat: event(ip: addr , sofware: string ,
raw: string , source_script: string);
302 @event
303 def detected_proxynat(ip, software , raw , source_script):
304 node = get_node(ip)
305 s = ProxyNat(software , source_script , raw , None)
306 found = False
307 for i in node.hostnames:
308 if s == i:
309 i.counter += 1
310 found = True
311 if not found:
312 s = ProxyNat(software , source_script , raw , node)
313 stats.proxy += 1
314 db.session.add(s)
315 db.session.commit ()
316 print("%-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s \t %-30s" % (
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source_script , "Detected proxy/NAT", ip, software))
317
318 def mode_bro_bridge ():
319 bc = Connection("127.0.0.1:47758")
320 print("starting")
321 while True:
322 bc.processInput ()
323 sleep (0.1)
324
325 def signal_handler(signal , frame):
326 print(stats)
327 print("Exiting (ctrl+c)")
328 sys.exit (0)
329
330 @app.route("/ip/<ip >")
331 def asset_request(ip=None):
332 node = Node.query.filter_by(ip_address=ip).first()
333 if node:
334 return json.dumps(node.serialize ())
335 return "{}"
336
337
338 @app.route("/")
339 def index ():
340 return render_template("index.html")
341
342
343 def mode_web ():
344 app.run(host="0.0.0.0")
345
346 if __name__ == "__main__":
347 signal.signal(signal.SIGINT , signal_handler)
348 parser = OptionParser ()
349 parser.add_option("-m", "--mode", action="store", type="
string", dest="mode", help="Choose mode. Either web
or bro mode must be specified")
350 (options , args) = parser.parse_args ()
351 mode = options.mode
352 print(mode)
353 if mode == "bro":
354 print("Starting in bridge mode")
355 mode_bro_bridge ()
356 elif mode == "web":
357 print("Starting in web mode")
358 mode_web ()
359 elif mode == "makedb":
360 print("Making initial database")
361 db.create_all ()
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362 db.session.commit ()
363 else:
364 print("This program requires a valid mode. Try ’
assetweb.py -m web’ or ’assetweb.py -m bro’")
B.2 bridge.bro
1 @load frameworks/communication/listen
2 @load base/protocols/http
3
4 # Let’s make sure we use the same port no matter whether we
use encryption or not:
5 redef Communication :: listen_port = 47758/ tcp;
6
7 # Redef this to T if you want to use SSL.
8 redef Communication :: listen_ssl = F;
9
10 # Set the SSL certificates being used to something real if
you are using encryption.
11 #redef ssl_ca_certificate = "<path >/ ca_cert.pem";
12 #redef ssl_private_key = "<path >/bro.pem";
13
14 global detected_software: event(ip: addr , software: string ,
version: string , raw: string , source_script: string);
15 global detected_os: event(ip: addr , os: string , version:
string , arch: string , raw: string , source_script: string
);
16 global detected_port: event(ip: addr , open_port: port , raw:
string , source_script: string);
17 global detected_hostname: event(ip: addr , hostname: string ,
raw: string , source_script: string);
18 global detected_proxynat: event(ip: addr , sofware: string ,
raw: string , source_script: string);
19
20 redef Communication :: nodes += {
21 ["assetlog"] = [$host = 127.0.0.1 , $connect=F, $ssl=
F]
22 };
B.3 assets_fedora.bro
1 @load base/protocols/http
2 @load base/frameworks/software
3
4 module HTTP;
5
6
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7 event http_all_headers(c: connection , is_orig: bool , hlist:
mime_header_list)
8 {
9 local script_name = "assets_fedora.bro";
10 local asset_detection_network = 10.0.0.1/8;
11 #Ignore clients we do not want to track
12 if(c$id$orig_h !in asset_detection_network)
13 return;
14
15 if ( is_orig )
16 return; #This script only cares about information
from server side , stopping here if communication
is from client
17
18 if ( c?$http &&
19 c$http?$uri &&
20 c$http?$user_agent &&
21 /\/ fedora \// in c$http$uri &&
22 /\/ updates \// in c$http$uri &&
23 /\.d?rpm$/ in c$http$uri)
24 {
25
26 local uri = c$http$uri;
27
28 #Split url and extract variables
29 local url_vector = split_all(uri , /\//);
30 local filename = url_vector [| url_vector |];
31 local package_and_version = split(filename , /\.fc/)
[1];
32 local package_and_version_vector = split_all(
package_and_version , /\-/);
33 local version = cat_string_array_n(
package_and_version_vector , |
package_and_version_vector| - 2, |
package_and_version_vector |);
34 local package = cat_string_array_n(
package_and_version_vector , 1, |
package_and_version_vector| - 4);
35
36 event detected_software(c$id$orig_h , package ,
version , uri , script_name);
37 }
38 }
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